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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past thirty-five years, international human rights lawyers and, more
recently, international environmental lawyers, have been invoking the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA)1 as a tool to prosecute human rights abuses committed abroad
by transnational corporations (TNs)2 in U.S. federal courts. The ATCA provides:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."'3 Although plaintiffs' lawyers have experienced some success in the hu-
man rights context,4 most claims of environmental abuses have failed.5 In all
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
2. Much debate surrounds the attempt to define transnational corporations. This Comment
adopts the flexible definition contained in the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR,
55th Sess., 22nd mtg. T 20, U.N Doc., E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) [hereinafter Norms],
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/55sub/55sub.htm. See generally David
Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901, (2003). "The
Norms are the first nonvoluntary initiative accepted at the international level." Id. at 903. They
define a transnational corporation as "an economic entity operating in more than one country or
a cluster of economic entities operating in two or more countries-whatever their legal form,
whether in their home country or country of activity, and whether taken individually or collec-
tively." Norms, supra 20. Notably, the Norms also apply to "other business enterprise[s],"
which the working group defined as "any business entity, regardless of the international or do-
mestic nature of its activities, including a transnational corporation, contractor, subcontractor,
supplier, licensee or distributor; the corporate, partnership, or other legal form used to establish
the business entity; and the nature of the ownership of the entity." Id. T 21.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
4. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (alleging com-
panies participated in human rights violations against them in retaliation for their political oppo-
sition to the companies' oil exploration activities in Nigeria); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256
F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (alleging Coca-Cola is liable for the murder, torture and
unlawful detainment committed by paramilitaries of five individuals/workers in retaliation for
union activities); Order Den. Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. on Phase I, Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco
Corp., No. C 99-2506 SI, 2004 WL 602774 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2004) (alleging that Nigerian
military troops, assisted by Chevron employees, shot peaceful protestors at Chevron's offshore
platform and destroyed two villages by shooting from Chevron-owned helicopters and boats);
Compl. for Equitable Relief and Damages. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (D.D.C. 2001) (No.
1:01CV01357) available at http://www.laborrights.org/projects/corporate/exxon/
exxoncomplaint.pdf (citing cases in which plaintiffs have overcome summary judgment mo-
tions attacking causes of action grounded in human rights).
5. See Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y., 1991) (dismissing for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction a claim brought under the ATCAagainst a U.S. corporation by
a British corporation because the environmental harm-the shipping of hazardous waste to a
foreign country without notice or permission-did not constitute a violation of international
environmental law); Torres v. Southern Peru Copper, 965 F Supp. 895 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (dis-
missing environmental claims); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999)
(dismissing claims of human rights violations, environmental torts, and cultural genocide against
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these cases, the reluctance of judges to enforce the ATCA against private actors is
palpable and, to some extent, puzzling. The more obvious reasons for this judicial
reluctance are tied to separation of powers concerns, particularly the fear of over-
involvement in foreign affairs and the resulting embarrassment that may befall the
political branches should the judiciary meddle in this area.
Other concerns, however, involve economics more than politics. Court opin-
ions in ATCA cases tend to be extensive and address a breadth of constitutional,
prudential and philosophical concerns, often without moving the law of the ATCA
toward greater clarity. This analytic confusion derives from the courts' tendency
to conflate political and economic concerns as well as jurisdictional and cause of
action questions, and their application of an outdated political question doctrine.
This confusion has led to a barrage of academic commentary on the role the ATCA
should play in many contexts. Most recently the focus has been on how the ATCA
might be applied to TNs for violations of human rights and internationally recog-
nized environmental standards. Human rights advocates support expanding its
reach to include a wider range of offenses; business interests oppose its applica-
tion to transnational corporations. The George W. Bush administration (Bush Ad-
ministration) has supported the latter view, arguing consistently that the ATCA
interferes with the executive prerogative in foreign affairs, and that from a legal
standpoint the statute grants federal courts jurisdiction but does not grant plaintiffs
a private cause of action.
Business interests and the Bush Administration have predicted that dire con-
sequences would flow from the expanded use oftheATCA. The Institute for Inter-
national Economics (IIE) recently published a treatise entitled Awakening Mon-
ster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789.6 The first chapter, "Nightmare Scenario,"7
predicts the rapid divestment of TNs in developing countries "with less than per-
fect observance of individual and labor rights and shortcomings in the realm of
political and environmental norms," should these ATCA suits be allowed to prolif-
erate. 8 The Bush Administration and business interests collectively charge that
Freeport-McMoran Copper & Gold, Inc., a Delaware mining corporation, for its activities in the
Pacific Rim because Beanal's pleadings did not allege facts sufficient to show that genocide
occurred or that Freeport acted in concert with the government, and because environmental
abuses do not violate the law of nations); Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120 (2d Cir.
200 1) (dismissing for lack of standing claims brought under the ATCA for environmental abuses
resulting from the highly toxic gas leak that killed thousands and injured more than 200,000
people); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing class action
suit brought by citizens of Ecuador under the ATCA against Texaco for environmental abuses in
connection with oil drilling on the grounds of forum non conveniens, international comity, and
the failure to join indispensable parties); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D.
Cal. 2002) (holding that plaintiffs stated a cause of action for violations of the law of war,
crimes against humanity, racial discrimination and the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, but dismissing the entire suit on grounds that the UNCLS and the racial discrimina-
tion claims violated the Act of State Doctrine, and that the political question doctrine barred all
remaining claims); Flores v. S. Peru Copper, 253 F. Supp. 2d 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd Flores
v. S. Peru Copper, 343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003).
6. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOsTAs, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE ALIEN
TORT STATUTE OF 1789 (Inst. for Int'l Econ., ed., 2003) [hereinafter AWAKENiNG MONSTER].
7. Id. at 1.
8. Id. at 1-2.
these lawsuits are often frivolous or politically motivated. 9 The Bush Administra-
tion has further argued that such encroachment into foreign policy undermines
long-term U.S. economic and diplomacy interests. 10 In a recent amicus brief filed
on behalf of Unocal Corporation in a suit pending against the company for its
involvement in the Bhopal gas leak disaster, the Bush Administration and a coali-
tion of national and international business groups echoed these arguments and un-
equivocally outlined their anti-ATCA stance.ll Amidst this noise, the U.S. Su-
preme Court agreed to hear an ATCA case involving a charge by a Mexican na-
tional against the U.S. government of arbitrary arrest and detention. 12 The Bush
Administration also filed an amicus brief in a different case before the Supreme
Court, asking the Court to effectively overturn Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the land-
mark case that ushered in the modem era of ATCA human rights litigation. 13 The
Bush Administration requested that the Court rule that the ATCA grants federal
courts jurisdiction over these claims, but does not grant plaintiffs a private cause
of action absent an express congressional directive. 14 The Supreme Court rejected
this view but urged the cautious use of judicial discretion in ATCA cases. 15
9. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal of the Judgment
against Defendant-Appellant Jose Francisco Sosa at 13-14, Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa, 331 F.3d
604 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 99-56880) [hereinafter Brief for U.S. in Alvarez-Machain].
10. Id. See also Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) [hereinafter Opposition Brief in Alvarez-Machain]; Brief for
the National Foreign Trade Council, USA*Engage, The National Association of Manufacturers,
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, and the United States Council for
International Business as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124
S. Ct. 2739 (2004) (urging the Supreme Court to grant writ in order to resolve the issue of
whether the ATCA creates a private right of action).
11. See Brief for the United State of America as Amicus Curiae, Doe v. Unocal,__ F 3d __
(9th Cir. May 2003) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628), available at http://www.earthrights.org/atca/
dojbrief.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Brief in Unocal].
12. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain v. U.S., 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). Twelve groups of amici
filed amicus curiae briefs in support of respondents (pro-ATCA); four groups of amici filed
amicus curiae briefs in support of petitioners (anti-ATCA). See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, No.
03-339, 2003 WL 22429204 at *18 (Oct. 6, 2003). Those filing in support of the respondent
included International Jurists; Alien Friends Representing Hungarian Jews and Bougainvilleans
Interests; Corporate Social Responsibility Amici; International Human Rights Organizations
and Religious Organizations; Women's Human Rights Organization; Center for Justice and Ac-
countability; National Consortium of Torture Treatment Programs and Individual ATCA Plain-
tiffs; Professors of Federal Jurisdiction and Legal History; the World Jewish Congress and the
American Jewish Committee; Career Foreign Service Diplomats; the Presbyterian Church of
Sudan and Clifton Kirkpatrick as Stated Clerk of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian
Church; National and Foreign Legal Scholars; and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
and the Rutherford Institute. Id. Those filing in support of the petitioner included the Washing-
ton Legal Foundation, National Fraternal Order of Police and Allied Educational Foundation;
National Foreign Trade Council, USA*Engage, the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., et al.;
the Pacific Legal Foundation; and the National Association of Manufacturers. Id. The Euro-
pean Commission filed an anicus brief on behalf of neither party. Id.
13. U.S. Brief in Unocal, supra note 11, at 1-5.
14. Id.
15. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. at 2761. Petitioners asked the court to retool the
now thirty-year approach of the circuit courts to ATCA cases partly in an attempt to quell suits
against TNs. In particular, the Bush Administration argued that ATCA claims encroach on the
ability of the political branches to conduct the war on terror by undermining the ability of the
executive to definitively set foreign policy, compromise, and negotiate. Brief for U.S. in Alvarez-
Machain, supra note 9, at 13-14. Furthermore, the Administration argued, as it consistently has,
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Human rights advocates view the ATCA as a more benign tool, one that bal-
ances profit-making and morality and does not represent judicial interference with
the powers constitutionally committed to the political branches. 16 Even among
human rights advocates, however, there is much disagreement. In the idealist tra-
dition, natural law adherents argue that human rights are the baseline from which
all international policy should be made. They emphasize "the ideal of constraints
on the exercise of power and the importance of world cooperation." 17 Realists, by
contrast, "focus on power as the dominant feature of international relations." 18
Neither side can fully come to terms with the role a statute like the ATCA should
play in the enforcement of human rights worldwide. For idealists, the assertion in
U.S. courts of jurisdiction over offenses occurring in other countries represents
that international law itself does not grant a cause of action and the ATCA is therefore only a
jurisdictional statute. Id. at 10-11. The Supreme Court rejected the Bush Administration's
cause of action analysis, holding that the statute both grants jurisdiction and furnishes a cause of
action for a limited universe of international law offenses. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct.
at 2758-59. The Court limited the types of cognizable offenses to those thal are as clearly
defined and specific as those existing at the time of the enactment of the ATCA in 1789-
offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and actions arising out of prize cap-
tures and piracy. Id. at 2759, 2761. Although the Court held that the claim in the present case,
arbitrary arrest and detention, was not sufficiently definite to be cognizable under the ATCA, it
affirmed the general Filartiga approach to ATCA cases, stating that
although the [ATCA] is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action, the
reasonable inference from the historical materials is that the statute was intended to
have practical effect the moment it became law. The jurisdictional grant is best read
as having been enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a
cause of action for the modest number of international law violations with a potential
for personal liability at the time.
Id. at 2761. The statute, then, implicitly grants discretion under common law principles in
federal courts to recognize (or create) new causes of action. See id. But see Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 124 S. Ct. at 2772-73 (Scalia, J, concurring) (arguing that no such discretion to infer
new causes of action remains with federal courts in the post-Erie era). Still, the majority opin-
ion urged extreme caution, observing that "there are good reasons for a restrained conception of
the discretion a federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of action of this kind"
and that "courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a
norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms" recognized in the opinion. Id. at
2761-62.
Noteworthy for those bringing cases against TNs is the acknowledgement that the ATCA
allowed for actions against private actors from the very beginning. See id. at 2761. This should
quell, to some degree, the insistence by ATCA opponents that the subjects of international law
are exclusively nation-states and not private citizens. See id. For further discussion of the
application of international law principles to private citizens, see Beth Stephens, Individuals
Enforcing International Law: The Comparative and Historical Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 433
(2002) (critiquing the traditionalist position as blind to the important place individuals have held
in the long history of international law) [hereinafter Stephens, Individuals].
16. See e.g., Natalie L. Bridgeman, Human Rights Litigation Under the ATCA as a Proxyfor
Environmental Claims, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2003); Richard L. Herz, Litigating
Environmental Abuses Under the Alien Tort Claims Act: A Practical Assessment, 40 VA. J. INT'L
L. 545 (2000); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsi-
bility, 111 YALE L. J. 443 (2001) [hereinafter Ratner, Corporations].
17. Harvey Rishikof, Framing International Rights with a Janusism Edge-Foreign Policy
and Class Actions-Legal Institutions as Soft Power, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 247, 251 (2003)
[hereinafter Rishikof, Janusism].
18. Id. at 250.
anti-cooperative behavior. Although it advances human rights ideals, it does so in
a unilateral manner. For realists, ATCA suits conflict with the goal of maintaining
U.S. power by undermining U.S. corporate and economic dominance. Further-
more, if these suits are pursued equitably-both against U.S. and foreign corpora-
tions-they will at times undermine U.S. interests, undercutting the pragmatist
view of a world predicated on power struggles.
Another level of the debate comes from traditionalists. They argue that inter-
national law exists primarily to regulate nation states. 19 International law under
this theory functions on the necessary premise that organized state actors are the
only cognizable players in the international system. 20 Although the individual has
historically been subject to international law, traditionalists argue, this has been
only in exceptional circumstances, such as piracy, and only when the individual
action proved to be a threat to the international system of organized nation-states. 21
Traditionalists also point out that since the nineteenth century, the power in inter-
national law has rested largely with nation-states, which have collectively agreed
to recognize and respect each others' concurrent authority as superior to the au-
thority of the individuals that comprise each nation-state. 22
19. See Stephens, Individuals, supra note 15, at 433.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 449. While Stephens argues forcefully for the role of the individual as both a
subject and object of international law, her examples of the historical right of individuals to
bring claims or to be sued for violations of international law are limited to piracy and slave
trading. Id. She also highlights the fact that after Nuremburg, "international law recognized
that individuals have the right to protection from their own government." Id. Stephens also
concedes that by the nineteenth century, "[P]ositivists dismissed the moral, natural law basis of
international obligations" and "gradually redefined [international law] to focus on state-to-state
relations." Id. at 448.
22. See id. at 447-49. Stephens highlights the pre-nineteenth century commitment to indi-
vidual rights under international law:
Ancient scholars had little difficulty understanding the role of individuals within in-
ternational law. Viewing international law as originating in part from religious or
natural law sources, they recognized that such norms applied directly to govern the
conduct of individuals. Through the end of the eighteenth century, international norms
and sanctions were viewed as founded upon religious belief as well as social custom
and reason. This set of sources led to the all-encompassing system of international
rules described by William Blackstone as founded upon "maxims and customs ... of
higher antiquity than memory of history can reach" and construed by reference to
"the law of nature and reason, being the only one in which all the contracting parties
are equally conversant and to which they are equally subject." These rules governed
all interactions among foreign states and their citizens, not just between sovereign
states.
Id. at 446 (footnotes omitted). Despite the individual's place in the pre-nineteenth century scheme,
when the portion of Blackstone's Commentaries, quoted by Stephens in her article, is examined
closely, it too reinforces the primacy of the nation-state:
The law of nations is a system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and established
by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world; in order to decide
all disputes, to regulate all ceremonies and civilities, and to insure the observance of
justice and good faith in that intercourse which must frequently occur between two or
more independent states, and the individuals belonging to each.
Id. Here, individuals are mentioned in a subordinate clause, which reads like an afterthought,
suggesting that the importance of the individual is subordinate to that of the nation-state.
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In the middle of this polarized debate over competing theories of the role of
U.S. courts in enforcing international law sit the judges, who must situate them-
selves between theory and reality. They confront the competing interests of the
litigants, the demands of the Constitution, the pronouncements of the executive
branch, their own conception of the role of the courts in enforcing international
law, and the emotional appeals of the victims and their families. Amidst such
complexity, judges have to decide cases in ways that do not understate or overstep
the power of the court. Through this lens, judges interpret international law, con-
sider whether the U.S. forum is most appropriate, and wrestle with court-created
doctrines of restraint. In dealing with both forum non conveniens objections and
political question concerns, in particular, courts continue to reposition themselves
in relationship to the political branches. Underlying these decisions always re-
main the larger questions of whether and where these cases should be heard. Courts'
answers to these questions reveal the theories that inform judicial rulings in the
international context.
Under current ATCA litigation, to be held liable for violations of international
law, a corporate actor must be acting under color of state authority.23 Thus, indi-
vidual (corporate) accountability is still dependent upon the basic component of
nation-states, because the existence and power of nation-states is what makes the
international system make sense. But the current reality of the international eco-
nomic system does not fit this paradigm. TNs often possess far greater power than
nation-states, 2 4 yet they have no recognizable borders nor are they answerable to
any one sovereign authority. They may be answerable in part to many different
23. Ratner, Corporations, supra note 16, at 465-66. Ratner points out that although the
Nuremburg trial "destroyed any notion that only states had rights under international law (or, in
other words, that states had duties only to other states), it did seem to rest on the premise that the
rights individuals have are principally against states." Id. "This seemingly originalist position
regarding human rights," he notes, "emphasizes that international law should distinguish be-
tween, on the one hand, ordinary crimes (e.g., murder) or torts (e.g., slander) between private
actors-which are outside its province and belong to domestic law-and, on the other hand,
governmental action, which is the true subject of international law." Id, at 466. Ratner counters
this originalist position by noting that international law already imposes duties on individuals to
refrain from the most egregious abuses-e.g., slavery, piracy, and genocide. Id. at 466-67. He
goes further, however, and recognizes that application of human rights law represents an exten-
sion of traditional principles, but one that is both legally and morally justifiable. Id. at 467.
First, he asserts, rights precede duties. That is, if the international community has recognized
the right of individuals to be free of torture and slavery (for example), then there is no limit on
those who may hold a duty to respect that right. Id. at 468. Furthermore, even if one begins
from a duty-based framework, such as a Kantian theorist would, the "dutyholders still encom-
pass a broad range of entities." Id. Finally, from the natural rights perspective, it is clear that
Locke never saw human rights as only against the state. Id. Over time, however, as power
became concentrated in the state, the assertion of those rights against the states became more
common and led to the currently flawed assumption that these inherent rights were only assertable
against the state. Id. at 468-69.
24. Scott Holwick, Transnational Corporate Behavior and its Disparate and Unjust Effects
on the Indigenous Cultures and the Environment of Developing Nations: Jota v. Texaco, a Case
Study. 11 CoLO. J. INT'L ENvrL. L. & PoL'Y 183, 192 (2000) ("Transnational corporations control
eighty percent of foreign investment and thirty percent of the world's gross national product..")
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authorities, but there is no final law the international community can point to that
regulates this actor.2 5
The distribution of power, therefore, has shifted, yet the legal community has
devised no systematic way of accounting for this shift and adjusting the law ac-
cordingly. 26 Moreover, no framework exists within Which nation-states can man-
age non-state actors possessing more power than the nation-states themselves. 27
Only subconsciously aware of this, courts frequently dismiss ATCA cases on any
number of grounds- no cause of action, presence of a nonjusticiable political ques-
tion, forum non conveniens 28 - in part because they feel comfortable and legally
justified in constructing arguments around the sanctity of the sovereign authority
of each state to prosecute harms that occur within its borders. 29 Judges often
dismiss these cases without recognizing that the very legal problem they confront
25. Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for Violating Interna-
tional Law, 4 UCLA J. INr'L L. & FOREIN AFF. 81, 86 (1999). Zia-Zarifi argues:
The transnational activity of corporations implicates a home country and a host coun-
try, each with their own interests. These interests, and the legal control of each coun-
try over a corporation, are not perfectly aligned, so at times the countries' jurisdic-
tions overlap and there is a jurisdictional lacuna where the corporation is not subject
to any law. In the case of many resource-extraction firms, the host government will
not upbraid the foreign MNC for actions that the government is involved in, while the
MNC's [multinational corporations] home courts are unlikely to engage in extraterri-
torial control. In other words, in many instances where a developing host country is
eager to attract corporate capital and expertise and, for various reasons, does not (or
cannot) subject corporate conduct to judicial scrutiny, a corporation acts without any
legal control, domestic or international. The long and short of it is that the legal status
of the MNCs under international law has not advanced significantly in the quarter
century since the International Court of Justice despaired of finding suitable interna-
tional legal principles for addressing the litigation surrounding the Barcelona Trac-
tion company and simply decided that famous case on the basis of domestic laws.
Id. at 86-87 (footnotes omitted).
26. Developments in the Law. International Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943,2030-31
(2001). This article points out that although states were traditionally viewed as the only subjects
of international law,
[i]t is now generally accepted that individuals have rights under international human
rights laws and obligations under international criminal law. This redefinition, how-
ever, has occurred only partially with respect to legal persons such as corporations:
international law views corporations as possessing certain human rights, but it gener-
ally does not recognize corporations as bearers of legal obligations under interna-
tional criminal law. The absence of criminal liability results mainly from the differ-
ent approaches that national legal systems have taken to corporate criminal liability.
Although many common law and some civil law jurisdictions recognize corporate
criminal liability, many do not.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
27. Rishikof, Janusism, supra note 17, at 248. Rishikof observes that "[t]errorist groups, as
NGOs, have called into question both domestic and international structures since they involve
non-state actors with multiple nationalities (including US citizens and aliens), loose affiliations
or networks involving criminal law, armed conflict conventions, and national security viola-
tions." Id. TNs present similar problems and challenge the international system in a parallel
fashion. It is the very multi-state character of TNs that makes private international law inca-
pable of dealing with them, partly because such litigation generally involves one country trying
a foreign corporation within its own borders for violations that impact the host country.
28. See sources cited supra note 5.
29. See infra Part II.B for a general discussion of the traditional bases of jurisdiction under
international law.
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stems from the fact that power in the international system has to some extent been
stripped away from nation-states. Despite this reality, courts still conceive of in-
ternational law as resting on the old assumptions of power distribution.
Application of the ATCA to corporations in this new context is compelling
courts to change the international law paradigm. As with any paradigm shift, there
is understandable resistance and confusion. Rather than reifying existing eco-
nomic structures, greasing the wheels of commerce, and ensuring the collective
security of organized nation-states, ATCA litigation in the corporate context asks
that the law acknowledge corporate actors as subjects of international law and to
prioritize individual dignity as a goal of international law. It challenges traditional
assumptions by insisting that international law is not exclusively about maintain-
ing the power of individual nation-states and facilitating commerce (which also
maintains the power of the status quo) and compels those involved in the system of
international law to unpack these assumptions and their effects and forge a new
paradigm. 30 When courts talk of deference to separate branches of government, or
deference to sovereign nations, they are accepting the old paradigms-when na-
tion-states were the primary actors on the international scene worthy of legal rec-
ognition and thus all other interests were subordinated to the maintenance of the
system of nation-states. In that system, the executive branch was supposed to be
the primary enforcer of international law because it, by Constitutional directive
and prudential conclusions, shaped foreign policy and molded foreign relations.
This Comment offers a different way to conceptualize these questions in the
context of ATCA litigation against corporate defendants. Rather than focus on the
traditional arguments about this law - what the First Congress intended, whether it
provides a private cause of action, which law applies and to whom-it will focus
on the issues underlying those questions. This comment seeks to contribute to the
debate over the ATCA by focusing on judge-made doctrines as they are applied to
ATCA suits involving corporate defendants and suggests ways in which such doc-
trines might be shifted or refined to account for the new legal and economic reali-
ties of globalization. Part II outlines the history of and the debate over the use of
the ATCA. Part III reviews application of the ATCA to corporate defendants and
identifies three barriers ATCA plaintiffs face in the corporate context-the limited
liability inherent in the corporate form and the added protection given corpora-
tions by the state-actor requirement, the forum non conveniens doctrine and the
political question doctrine. Part IV draws lessons for U.S. judges from Belgium's
experience with its universal jurisdiction law and from this country's precedent in
matters concerning piracy law. When updated to account for the reality of eco-
nomic globalization, both models can assist judges in reviewing ATCA claims
against corporations. Part V concludes by commenting on the problem with cur-
rent legal thinking and the ways it has begun and should continue to shift in order
to account for the realities of globalization.
Overall, this Comment argues that the ATCA forces courts to reassess their
assumptions about the distribution of power, in both domestic and international
arenas, and come to a more balanced assessment of the proper role of U.S. courts
30. This process is particularly difficult from the vantage point of the most powerful country
on earth. The United States clearly has an interest in retaining the existing power structure and
reifying those tenets of international law that support its place in the global system.
in the enforcement of international human rights norms. Because individuals and
non-state actors are increasingly subjects of private international law, and because
national borders are now porous and diffuse, U.S. courts, at least in the short-term,
should assert the rule of law in ATCA cases as a form of "soft power" 3 1 in an
increasingly interdependent, globalized world in which the exporting of capital-
ism has led to the dominance of corporate wealth and the supplanting of nation
states by non-state actors seeking private gain.
II. A HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OFATCA LITIGATION
A. Background
For the 190 years following the passage of the ATCA, the statute was invoked
only twenty-one times, 32 remaining an unremarkable provision of the Judiciary
Act of 1789.33 In the past twenty-four years, however, the ATCA has been in-
voked and led to published decisions in about eighty cases. 34 Its original passage
was prompted by circumstances or purposes that legal historians seem unable to
agree upon. 35 Many who oppose current uses of the ATCA argue that current
31. See Rishikof, Janusism, supra note 17, at 275-76. Rishikof describes international theo-
rist Joseph Nye's conception of hard and soft power. Id. "Soft power involves the ability to
influence action through the institutionalization of the value of liberty, human rights, and de-
mocracy." Id. at 275. Currently, soft power is applied in cultural institutions, such as universi-
ties, "cultural exports ... and international organizations." Id. Institutionalizing soft power
requires that tribunals of some sort be available to enforce the rules. Id. at 276. Rishikof points
out that if a world power like the United States and those international institutions dominated by
the U.S. stand on the sidelines as human rights abuses occur, "the morality of the system will be
called into question." Id. He also notes, however, that "[h]aving only one state actor, or having
only one state's courts be the sole forum for redress, will breed deep resentment no matter how
well-intentioned." Id. This points to the ultimate wisdom of an international tribunal for the
adjudication of corporate international law that is binding on TNs.
This Comment attempts to offer a vision of the ATCA that can be applied presently but does
not suggest that this is the ideal legal enforcement mechanism. Ultimately, an international
tribunal, binding on all signatories, should be established to police the conduct of TNs. See id.
To date, however, multiple nonvoluntary codes of corporate conduct have emerged as regula-
tory mechanisms. Recently, a binding code of corporate conduct was issued by the U.N. See
Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 2, at 903, and accompanying text. The ATCA, therefore,
brings redress to victims of human rights violations in a lawful manner during this transitional
period and marks the emergence of new international regulatory structure. See generally Rishikof,
Janusism, supra note 17, at 251.
32. Bridgeman, supra note 16, at 4.
33. Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article I1I, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 588
(2002) [hereinafter Bradley, Article 1111.
34. See Stephens, Individuals, supra note 15, at 437.
35. See William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Claims Statute: A Re-
sponse to the "Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 221 (1996) (arguing that legis-
lative and constitutional history support the notion that the ATCA grants courts both jurisdiction
and provides a cause of action, as found in the law of nations, which should be discerned by the
courts and applied to each case). But see Bradley, Article III, supra note 33, at 590-91 (arguing
that the ATCA provides only jurisdiction; a cause of action may only be defined by Congress-
not the judiciary-as Congress so chooses to interpret international law and explicitly make it
part of domestic law).
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applications run far afield of the framer's intent. 36 Both sides of the debate are
able to find indirect support for their argument in historical documents and early
case law, but most acknowledge the lack of a clear statement of congressional
intent. Indeed, discerning the ATCA's original intent has become fodder for exten-
sive academic commentary that has attempted to fill in gaps in legislative his-
tory.37 In the end, the only thing these commentators seem to agree about is that
the precise role the ATCA should play continues to elude jurists and commentators
alike. 38
Unlike the general grant of federal subject matter jurisdiction, 39 the ATCA
has been read both to.confer jurisdiction and grant a cause of action if a violation
of the law of nations or a treaty can be shown.40 Some argue that the statute
confers only jurisdiction and no cause of action, but this is a minority view.4 1 The
narrowest reading of the statute states that is does nothing more than grant federal
courts jurisdiction over these types of suits, which means a cause of action will
only lie if Congress has explicitly defined a violation in a separate statute.42 A
slightly broader construction would allow the statute to cover only the causes of
action recognized by the framers in 1789.43 Those advancing this theory invoke
36. See discussion, infra Part II.C.2, of Judge Bork's opinion in Tel-Oren; see generally
Samuel Estreicher, Rethinking the Binding Effect of Customary International Law, 44 VA. J.
INT'L L. 5, 15 (2003); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARv. L. REv. 815, 831-34 (1997).
But see Dodge, supra note 35, at 256.
37. See, e.g., supra notes 34-35, notes and accompanying text.
38. Jean Wu, Note, Pursuing International Environmental Tort Claims Under the ATCA:
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 487,493 (2001).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
40. In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F2d 774 (D.C. Cit. 1984), Judge Edwards and
Judge Bork fundamentally disagree as to whether the ATCA confers a cause of action. Judge
Bork interprets section 1350 to be strictly a grant of jurisdiction, like section 1331, and insists
that plaintiffs must locate a cause of action under the law of nations or in another congressional
statute. Id. at 777. In contrast, Judge Edwards adopts the "Filartiga approach" and finds the
ATCA to grant a right to sue as well as jurisdiction. Id. at 776-77. Judge Edwards points to the
fact that international law does not mandate a particular reaction to violation, but instead leaves
the specifics up to each individual country. Id. at 777-78.
41. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 36 (arguing against the "modern position"
and asserting that customary international law should not be incorporated into federal common
law absent explicit congressional mandate) and Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739,2769-
76 (2004) (Scalia, J. concurring), with Dodge, supra note 35 (arguing that the ATCA does pro-
vide for both jurisdiction and a cause of action under customary international law, and that
customary international law is part of the federal common law that may be interpreted and ap-
plied by courts even in the absence of legislation explicitly incorporating it into U.S. law).
42. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F2d at 799 (Bork, J., concurring); see also
Michael I. Morely, The Law of Nations and the Offenses Clause of the Constitution: A Defense
of Federalism, 112 YALE L.J. 109, 118-19 (2002) (arguing that the "law of nations" is not syn-
onymous with "international law" or "customary international law"; it does not include agree-
ments or norms that address a country's treatment of its own nationals nor does it evolve with
time; instead, the law of nations is more akin to natural law and is therefore static and unchange-
able and cannot, as the Filartiga formulation suggests, evolve over time). Moreover, notes
Morely, "[blecause of the immutable nature of the law of nations, the Offenses Clause, unlike
other constitutional provisions, was not expected to evolve with time." Id. at 119.
43. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F2d at 815 (Bork, J., concurring). Here
Judge Bork, while arguing the statute only grants jurisdiction, concedes that the framers may
have intended to make law of nations grievances recognized at the time -namely the infringe-
ment of the rights of ambassadors and piracy. Id.
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Blackstone's definition of the "law of nations" as encompassing only "a limited
universe of seriously egregious infractions." 44 A broader position still would have
courts treat customary international law as general law, "a third category of law,
neither state nor federal in nature."'45 Professor Bradley argues that the law of
nations portion of the ATCA was simply intended to implement Article III alienage
jurisdiction, and that the First Congress "implicitly intended to limit the Alien Tort
Statute to suits involving at least one U.S. citizen defendant."' 46 Again, it remains
unclear what types of offenses Congress intended to bring within its scope. 47
In 1980, the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala offered a broad inter-
pretation of the ATCA.48 This formulation would have courts embrace interna-
tional law as part of federal common law, holding that international law consists of
those rules that "command the 'general assent of civilized nations.' 49 Evidence
for such rules can be found "'by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly
on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial deci-
sions recognizing and enforcing that law.' 50 In a much earlier case, Justice Story
explained that "every doctrine, that may be fairly deduced by correct reasoning
from the rights and duties of nations, and the nature of moral obligation, may
theoretically be said to exist in the law of nations."'5 1 Moreover, modem courts
have tended to view the law of nations as "embracing modem international legal
understandings."'52 The Filartiga court conceived of international law as evolv-
ing, and mandated that "courts... interpret international law not as it was in 1789,
but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today."53 This
formulation of the nature of the law of nations is the most widely accepted among
courts today.54
Congress ratified the Filartiga decision when it passed an amendment to the
ATCA in 1992, the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). 55 By enacting the TVPA,
"Congress expressly intended both to codify and to extend to [U.S.] citizens the
Second Circuit's holding in Filartiga."56 The accompanying legislative history to
44. Wu, supra note 38, at 494.
45. Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J.
INT'L L. 365. 370 (2002).
46. Bradley, Article III, supra note 33, at 591.
47. See Brad J. Kieserman, Comment, Profits and Principles: Promoting Multinational Cor-
porate Responsibility by Amending the Alien Tort Claims Act, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 881, 889
(1999). Keiserman argues that the confusion over the ATCA must be rectified by a congres-
sional amendment to the statute along the lines of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and
the Torture Victim Protections Act. Id. at 932-36.
48. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
49. Id. at 881 (quoting The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677,694 (1900)).
50. Id. at 880 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820)).
51. United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551).
52. Wu, supra note 38, at 495.
53. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 881 (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dail.) 198
(1796)).
54. This interpretation seems to have survived the recent Supreme Court case, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2763-64 (2004), although the Court urges federal judges to exercise
extreme caution when asked to define new causes of action based on the evolution of interna-
tional law, id. at 2764. See supra text accompanying note 13.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
56. Young, supra note 45, at 458 n.484 (citing Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law
Really State Law? 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1845 (1998)).
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the TVPA made clear that by its passage Congress did not intend to limit the appli-
cation of the ATCA to other offenses. 57 The House Report states that Congress
wanted to "establish an unambiguous and modem basis for a cause of action" for
torture, partly in response to Judge Bork's questioning of the ATCA in Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic.58 In spite of the acknowledgment of the debate over whether
the ATCA provides a cause of action absent express congressional mandate, the
House Report also stated that "[slection 1350 has other important uses and should
not be replaced. ' 59 Courts that have addressed the ATCA and the TVPA since the
passage of the TVPA "have found them to be complimentary, and have refused,
thus far, to view the explicit grant of a cause of action in the case of torture and
extra-judicial killings as a reason to require such explicit grants in other cases not
concerning torture and extra-judicial killings."60
B. Traditional International Law Principles and the ATCA
A word about universal jurisdiction will help explain the jurisdictional confu-
sion that arises when the ATCA is invoked. The statute provides courts with a
domestic basis for jurisdiction, but the question remains whether such assertions
of jurisdiction- where there may be no clear nexus between the defendant, plain-
tiff and the United States-run afoul of jurisdictional principles under interna-
tional law. The basis for international jurisdiction has traditionally been found in
the criminal context, 61 and determining which country may assert jurisdiction de-
57. H.R. REP. No. 102-367, pt.2, at 4 (1991).
58. Id. at 3. See discussion of Tel-oren infra Part II.C.2.
59. Id.
60. Jason Jarvis, Comment, A New Paradigm for the Alien Tort Statute Under Extraterritori-
ality and the Universality Principle, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 671, 689 (2003). Based on his survey of
legal history, Jarvis argues that the application of the ATCA was not meant to be applied extra-
territorially, nor is it in compliance with principles of universal jurisdiction. Id. at 672, 694.
Some have called for Congress to amend the ATCA to clarify its basis and the causes of action it
is meant to encompass. See Kieserman, supra note 47. Kieserman argues specifically that the
current legal bases for prosecuting TNs under the ATCA is dubious, and he proposes that "judge-
made federal common law be augmented by amending the ATCA to incorporate specific claims
into U.S. domestic law, rather than basing jurisdiction solely on the narrow and subjective legal
fiction of universal norms." Id. at 889.
61. Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEx. L. Rv.
785, 786-87 (1988). Because jurisdictional questions in international law have been handled
mostly in the criminal context, interesting questions arise as to the wisdom of applying these
same doctrines to the assertion of jurisdiction in civil cases. Indeed, the cleaner means to en-
force corporate accountability abroad would be to pass a federal criminal law defining specific
offenses and the minimum contacts the company must have with the United States in order to
allow the U.S. to prosecute these crimes on behalf of the public. As the law currently stands, an
alien is granted standing to seek a civil remedy in a U.S. court, and the courts thereby struggle to
find applicable international standards to define the "tort in violation of the law of nations" as
well as a basis to assert jurisdiction -thus creating a civil cause of action for which courts must
then look to international criminal law for applicable standards. Passing a federal criminal
statute would make it easier for the courts to apply traditional international jurisdictional prin-
ciples, including those of universal jurisdiction, to these cases because courts could comfortably
rest on international law precedent in so doing. Indeed, the squeamishness on the part of courts
in these cases seems to rest partly on the fact that they suspect foreign citizens of bringing suit in
the U.S. in order to maximize potential damage awards, rather than to pursue justice. Further,
by merely conceptualizing these offenses as "civil" and not criminal trivializes them, as if to
suggest they are not serious enough to be called "crimes," in spite of the fact that the only way
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pends "on reconciling a state's interest in a particular offense with other states'
interests in the offense."'62 In striking this balance, courts have applied either the
territoriality principle, the nationality principle, the passive personality principle,
the protective principle, or the universality principle. 6 3
The universality principle "provides every state with jurisdiction over a lim-
ited category of offenses generally recognized as of universal concern." 64 Univer-
sal jurisdiction focuses on what has been done rather than who committed it or
where it was committed. It derives from concepts of natural law, and is supported
by international consensus that the specific act is so egregious that it constitutes an
offense against all people, which therefore may be prosecuted by any nation.65
The source of this jurisdiction springs from the nature of the act itself and there-
fore transcends the borders of sovereign nations. Indeed, universal jurisdiction
applies to the "easy" cases -genocide, crimes against humanity, torture, and ter-
rorism-acts that are universally condemned, in word if not in deed.
The concept of universal jurisdiction seems to significantly impact the court's
analyses under the ATCA. Although the term "universal jurisdiction" never ex-
plicitly arises in ATCA cases, because the statute itself is jurisdictional, the basis
for international jurisdiction under international law lurks in the background. If an
international law violation is found in an ATCA case, then the court has jurisdic-
tion under the ATCA. However, such automatic jurisdiction may not comport with
traditional jurisdictional principles under international law.66 That is, without the
ATCA, no other basis for jurisdiction exists under international law; the traditional
nexus between the forum and the offense often does not exist, and by definition the
victims are never U.S. citizens. 67 Thus, even though expressly told to assume
jurisdiction by Congress, judges place onerous threshold requirements on plain-
tiffs in ATCA cases in an attempt to avoid overreaching under the rules of interna-
tional law.68 Put another way, a conflict exists between domestic (ATCA) and
international principles of jurisdiction. The insistence that offenses be "clear and
unambiguous," for example, derives not from the language of the ATCA but, rather,
from case law applying the ATCA.69 This requirement is one way judges review-
ing ATCA claims reconcile traditional principles ofjurisdiction under international
we find a "tort" in violation of the law of nations will be if the court finds that an international
crime has been committed. See generally id. at 787 n.7 (citing Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdic-
tion at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J.
INT'L L. 280 (1982) (asserting that public and private international law are based on the same
values)).
62. Randall, supra note 61, at 786.
63. Id. at 787-88. The territoriality principle applies when the offense occurs within a pros-
ecuting state's territory. Id. Traditionally, civil cases are left to the discretion of the countries in
which those violations occur, to be tried based on that country's domestic law. Id. at 787 n.7
(citing Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Stand-
point of the Rule of Law, 92 RECUE1L DEs CouRs 1,218 (1957)). The nationality principle looks
to the nationality of the offender as the basis for jurisdiction; the passive personality principle
focuses on the nationality of the victim; the protective principle applies when "an extraterritorial
act threatens the state's security or a basic governmental function." Id. at 787-88.
64. Id. at 788.
65. See id. at 788, 800.
66. See Randall, supra note 61, at 786-91.
67. See id.
68. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
69. Id.
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law with the seemingly broad grant of jurisdiction under the ATCA.
Furthermore, ruling in a particular case could offend a home country (where
the harm occurred) or could interfere with diplomatic efforts underway in the ex-
ecutive branch.70 Notably, however, the minimum contacts requirement of per-
sonal jurisdiction ensures that defendants have some contact with the United
States.71 In the corporate context, this means that the parent corporation conducts
a sufficient amount of business in the United States to create the nexus that some
lament is often missing in ATCA cases. 72
C. Landmark ATCA Cases: Filartiga v. Pena-Irala to the Present-Evolving and
Conflicting Interpretations of the ATCA
1. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala
In this 1980 case, the Second Circuit embraced the notion that federal courts
should hear ATCA claims for violation of international law, even if neither party
was a U.S. citizen. 73 The Filartiga court's interpretation of the ATCA and subse-
quent questions raised by Judge Bork and Judge Robb of the D.C. Circuit74 sparked
70. See infra, Parts 11.B, C.
71. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that Royal
Dutch Petroleum was "doing business" in New York for personal jurisdiction purposes solely on
the basis that it maintained agents in New York who worked exclusively on investor relations).
"Under New York law, a foreign corporation is subject to general personal jurisdiction in New
York if it is 'doing business' in the state." Id. at 95. "Doing business" means the company
maintains "'continuous, permanent, and substantial activity in New York."' Id. (quoting Landoil
Resources Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1990)). In
response to the defendants' argument that its investor relations office in New York was not
important to the company because it only dealt with investor relations and matters only indi-
rectly related to its core business, the court remarked,
The defendants are huge publicly-traded companies with a need for access to capital
markets. The importance of their need to maintain good relationships with existing
investors and potential investors is illustrated by the fact that they pay over half a
million dollars per year to maintain the Investors Relations Office.
Id. at 96. It is curious that courts will stretch to find minimum contacts under the personal
jurisdiction analysis, yet when prudential doctrines arise, they will stretch in the opposite direc-
tion-tipping the scales in favor of dismissal and arguing that ATCA cases are problematic
precisely because the harm did not occur in the United States (which often morphs into a territo-
rial sovereignty argument).
72. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Most Americans would prob-
ably be surprised to learn that victims of atrocities committed in Bosnia are suing the leader of
the insurgent Bosnian-Serb forces in a United States District Court in Manhattan"). Compare
with Aguinda v. Texaco, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002) (examining the contacts of U.S.-based
Texaco to its partly-owned Ecuadorian subsidiary as a basis for finding liability and dismissing
on forum non conveniens ground after finding proper personal jurisdiction); Doe v. Unocal, 963
F Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding sufficient minimum contacts to warrant personal juris-
diction but currently considering which standard of vicarious liability should apply in the case).
See also Wiwa 4. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, in which the court responded to
defendants' fairness objection to the assertion of personal jurisdiction by repeatedly referencing
that "defendants control a vast, wealthy, and far-flung business empire which operates in most
parts of the globe" as sufficient evidence of the fairness of their being subjected to a New York
court's jurisdiction. id. at 99.
73. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
74. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J. & Robb,
J., concurring separately).
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the modem debate over the original intent and the modem scope of the statute. 75
Dr. Filartiga, a citizen of the Republic of Paraguay and an outspoken oppo-
nent of the Paraguayan government, brought an action against Americo Norberto
Pena-Irala (Pena), a citizen of Paraguay and the former Inspector General of a
local police force, for abducting and torturing Joelito, Dr. Filargita's son, to death. 76
When Dr. Filartiga brought criminal charges in a Paraguayan court, his lawyer was
arrested and threatened with death. 77 The attorney was subsequently disbarred"without just charge." 7 8 At the time the Filarliga case was brought in New York,
four years after Joelito's murder, the criminal case in Paraguay was still pending,
and a member of the Pena household, Hugo Duarte, had suspiciously confessed to
the murder.79 Despite his confession, Duarte was never convicted of the crime.80
It was quite obvious that Paraguay, despite its law against official torture, did not
intend to prosecute the crime.
Subsequent to the torture incident, Pena legally entered the United States.8 1
When Dolly Filartiga, Joelito's sister, learned that Pena was in New York, she
notified Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS), who arrested Pena and be-
gan deportation proceedings. 82 Before deportation actually occurred, Dolly filed
a complaint in federal court alleging wrongful death and torture by a state official
and seeking compensatory damages, 83 claiming jurisdiction in part under the
ATCA. 84
The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction 85 and suggested
that the "law of nations" under the ATCA excluded a state's treatment of its own
citizens. 86 On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs had established a
violation of the law of nations. 87 The court emphasized that such sources must be
used to determine what the law actually is and not "what the law ought to be," but
concluded that official torture was a violation of the law of nations. 88 In support
of this conclusion, the court relied on the U.N. Charter, which sets forth in great
detail the definition of torture, the extent of the prohibition against torture, and the
forms of redress victims of torture may seek. 89 This Resolution was adopted with-
75. See supra Part II.A for discussion of conflicting versions of "framer's intent."
76. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 878.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. The implication is that the confession was staged to absolve Pena of the crime. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 879.
83. Id.
84. Id. Plaintiffs claimed jurisdiction under general federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.
1331, and a cause of action arising under wrongful death statutes, the U.N. Charter, the Univer-
sal Declaration on Human Rights, the U.N. Declaration Against Torture, the American Declara-
tion of the Rights and Duties of Man, and "other pertinent declarations, documents and practices
constituting the customary international law of human rights and the law of nations." Id.
85. Id. at 880.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 881 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
89. ld. at 882-83 (citing the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Sub-
jected to Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N. Doc. A/
1034 (1975)).
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out dissent, and specifically defined the obligations of member nations under the
U.N. Charter.90 Although the U.N. Charter is not wholly self-executing, the court
noted, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights did not fit into the "dichotomy
of 'binding treaty' against 'non-binding pronouncement'; the Declaration had
become an "'authoritative statement of the international community."' 9 1 Because
this had gradually become part of state practice, the Declaration had evolved into
a norm binding on all states. 92 With the offense clearly defined, multiple treaties
and accords indicating international consensus that torture was prohibited, and
states in fact enforcing that prohibition, the Filartiga court concluded that interna-
tional law clearly prohibited torture. The plaintiffs made out a threshold case for
violation of the law of nations, and the court could properly take jurisdiction under
the ATCA.9 3
The executive branch reinforced this interpretation of international law in a
joint Memorandum of the Justice and State Departments to the court, which de-
scribed the "universal abhorrence" to torture. The government's assertions were
based on diplomatic exchanges between embassy personnel, and suggested that
countries that do engage in torture do so without sanction, fully aware of the uni-
versal prohibition.94 This awareness of the prohibition, in spite of the existence of
state practices to the contrary, suggested that states have agreed to abide by this
rule.95 Based primarily on the practice of nations, the United Nations convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) agreement and the concurrence by the executive
branch, the Filartiga court resoundingly declared that "[tihe prohibition is clear
and unambiguous, and admits of no distinction between treatment of aliens and
citizens." 96
The Filartiga court also embraced international law, declaring that the "con-
stitutional basis for the Alien Tort [Claims Act] is the law of nations, which has
always been part of the federal common law." 97 The court pointed out that com-
mon law courts regularly adjudicated "transitory tort claims" -torts between indi-
viduals over whom the court had personal jurisdiction regardless of where the tort
occurred-and this, combined with the "articulated scheme of federal control over
external affairs" supported the claim that federal courts have jurisdiction over vio-
lations of international law committed abroad. 98 To support its contention that
international law is part of federal common law, the Filartiga court cited
90. Id. at 883.
91. Id. (quoting E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 70 (1964)).
92. Id. (citing U.N. ESCOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 8, at 15, U.N. Doc. E/cn.4/l/610 (1962)
(memorandum of Office of Legal Affairs, U.N. Secretariat)).
93. Id. at 878.
94. Id. at 884.
95. Id. at 884 n. 15 (citing J. BRIERLY, THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAw 4-5 (1944)).
96. Id. at 884. With regard to the position of the U.S. government, the court later stated that
the many treaties it cites in the opinion,
as well as the express foreign policy of our own government, all make it clear that
international law confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis their own gov-
ernments. While the ultimate scope of those rights will be a subject for continuing
refinement and elaboration, we hold that the right to be free from torture is now among
them.
Id. at 884-85 (footnote omitted).
97. Id. at 885.
98. Id.
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Blackstone's Commentaries, a decision of the Pennsylvania Court of Oyer and
Terminer at Philadelphia under the Articles of Confederation, and a law review
commentary on the subject.99 The idea of incorporating international law into the
law of the land sprung from "'the demands of an expanding commerce and under
the influence of theories widely accepted in the late sixteenth, the seventeenth and
the eighteenth centuries." '' 10 0 The court insisted that incorporation of interna-
tional law into domestic law is consistent with the Framers' intent and with early
decisions applying international law. 10 1
The court also rejected the argument that Congress must expressly define the
international law violation before it can be enforced in U.S. courts, calling it "ex-
travagant," 102 and citing the Supreme Court cases Ware v. Hylton,10 3 The Paquete
Habana, 104 and Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino105 as support. The Filartiga
99. Id. at 886.
100. Id. (quoting Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 26 (1952)).
101. See generally Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of
the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26 (1952). In Filartiga, Judge Kaufman calls Dickinson a
"leading commentator." Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 886. Dickinson's article traces the
inclusion and development of the law of nations into U.S. law. In describing the context in
which the Constitutional Convention convened, he notes:
If we are to understand the plan for "a more perfect union" which a constitutional
convention was soon to produce, it is essential that we recapture something of the
ideological climate of the time. It was late in the eighteenth century. Excepting only
the ideals of religion, there were probably no ideals of such impact upon the minds of
men as the ideals of law. Leaders in law had a knowledge of contemporary legal
thought and of the great legal systems which has rarely been equaled [sic] since in this
country. It was axiomatic among them that the Law of Nations, applicable to indi-
viduals and to states, was an integral part of the law which they administered or prac-
ticed. The great principles of the Declaration of Independence were indisputably
legal principles. "Full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, estab-
lish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which Independent States may of
right do" came straight from that universal jurisprudence which had been elaborated
in the treatises of Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Vattel and others. These treatises
were an essential and significant part of the minimal equipment of any lawyer of
erudition in the eighteenth century. It will be remembered that a majority of the
delegates to the convention soon to be convened were lawyers and that among the
more influential were many of an enviable learning. Whenever in terms or by impli-
cation they spoke or wrote with reference to the Law of Nations, they were indulging
no mere flights of hopeful rhetoric ... .. [T]here appears to have been an impressive
measure of agreement at the outset that the Law of Nations and treaties must be the
subjects... of a paramount national concern.
Dickinson, supra, at 35-37.
102. See also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). In determining whether Congress had
provided for the establishment of military commissions, the Court noted that Congress included
"all offenses which are defined... by the law of war." Id. at 30. The Court observed, "Congress
had the choice of crystallizing in permanent form and in minute detail every offense against the
law of war, or of adopting the system of common law applied by military tribunals so far as it
should be recognized and deemed applicable by the courts. It chose the latter." Id. In an
accompanying footnote, the Court compares this provision in the Articles of War with the ATCA,
suggesting that the ATCA also represented a conscious choice by Congress to allow the offenses
therein to be defined by the law of nations, just as Congress allowed the offenses which may be
tried by military commissions to be defined by the law of war. See id. at n.6.
103. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 198 (1796).
104. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
105. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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court relied on the Supreme Court's express rejection of this argument in U.S. v.
Smith. 106 Notably, the court observed that questions of federal jurisdiction- and
not just questions involving the content of international law -must be considered
as part of an evolutionary process that may change over time. 10 7
There are several things worth noting about the Filartiga decision. First, the
court relied heavily on the fact that the crime of torture was exceedingly well-
defined in international treaties and agreements. Second, the court knew that the
Executive and Legislative branches agreed with its construction of the ATCA and
the role of international law in domestic courts in general. Third, the opinion
rested on the assumption that the framers intended that international law be part of
U.S. law, and that our courts had a duty to enforce international law. Finally, it
underscored in emphatic, idealistic terms the importance of human rights:
In the modem age, humanitarian and practical considerations have combined to
lead the nations of the world to recognize that respect for fundamental human
rights is in their individual and collective interest... [This decision is] a small
but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people from
brutal violence. 108
2. The Post-Filartiga Debate: Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic
Several landmark decisions followed in the decades after Filartiga. The first,
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, laid out the debate over interpretation and ap-
plication of the ATCA in the context of a terrorism case. 109 Survivors and repre-
sentatives of those murdered in an armed attack on a civilian bus by members of
the PLO brought suit in federal court against the Republic of Libya and various
Arab organizations, seeking damages for the alleged torture and murder of civil-
ians by a state organization acting for political purposes. 110 "Most of the victims
of the attack were Israeli citizens, but a few were American and Dutch citizens." 111
Plaintiffs sued in federal court, claiming this attack violated the international pro-
hibition against torture and murder, and alleging jurisdiction and a right to sue
under the ATCA. 112 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit addressed only the issue of whether
the plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to meet the threshold jurisdictional require-
ments.113 Each of the three judges on the panel held that the case should be dis-
missed, but on different grounds. 114
106. See discussion of U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820), infra Section IV.B.2.
The Filartiga court cited The Charming Betsy as "the plainest evidence that international law
has an existence in the federal courts independent of acts of Congress." Filartiga v. Pena-frala,
630 F.2d at 887. n.20. Specifically, the court relied on Chief Justice Marshall's assertion that"an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other pos-
sible construction remains . I..." d  (quoting The Charming Besty. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch), 34, 67
(1804)).
107. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F2d at 881 (citing generally Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
198 (1796)).
108. 1d. at 890.
109. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).




114. Id. at 775.
Judge Edwards affirmed the legal principles articulated in Filartiga but dis-
missed the case on a factual distinction between it and Filartiga.115 While the
defendant in Filartiga was acting under color of state authority, the PLO in this
case was not a state actor and thus could not be liable for the crime of torture under
international law,1 16 -an early version of the debate in many current ATCA claims
against corporations. 1 17 Judge Edwards admitted this point was hotly debated, but
he was unwilling to extend liability to non-state actors absent a Supreme Court
directive. 118 Judge Edwards acknowledged the current "mix of views about pri-
vate party liability," 119 but also admitted that that throughout the eighteenth and
into the nineteenth century, most "believed that rules of international law bound
individuals as well as states." 120 Because he saw backtracking on individual li-
ability in the twentieth century, however, Judge Edwards refused to extend liabil-
ity on the facts of Tel-Oren. 12 1 Only piracy, slave trading, and "a handful of other
private acts" survived the "19th century swing toward statism," he argued, and
therefore there simply was not sufficient consensus on the rule against non-official
torture to warrant its application to the PLO. 122
Judge Bork's opinion revealed his hostility toward ATCA litigation. Bork
argued that federal common law neither explicitly nor impliedly granted a cause of
action for violations of international law. 123 He based this conclusion on separa-
115. Id. at 798 (Edwards, J., concurring). Judge Edwards agreed with the following four
propositions derived from the Filartiga decision: (1) the law of nations is not stagnant and
should be construed as changing organically with changed perceptions of international law; (2)
the customs and usages of "civilized nations" serves as one source of international law; (3)
modem international law proscribes state-sponsored torture, conferring a fundamental right on
people to be free from torture; and (4) the ATCA allows federal courts to adjudicate rights al-
ready recognized by international law. Id. at 777.
116. Id. at 795 (Edwards, J., concurring).
117. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd inpart, rev'd in
part, by Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g en bahc granted,
opinion vacated, Doe v. Unocal Corp., __ F.3d. __, 2003 WL 359787, at * 1 (9th Cir. 2003);
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d. Cir. 2000).
118. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 795 (Edwards, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 794 (Edwards, J., concurring).
120. Id. (Edwards, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 794-95 (Edwards, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 794 (Edwards, J., concurring). Judge Edwards also dispensed with Judge Bork's
argument that § 1350 is nothing more than a jurisdictional grant. Id. at 779-80, nn.3-4 (Edwards,
J., concurring). Judge Edwards compared "arising under" jurisdiction in § 1331 with § 1350.
Id. at 779 (Edwards, J., concurring). Applying the policy of plain language, Judge Edwards
pointed to the fact that Congress knew how to grant jurisdiction because it had done so in §
1331. Id. (Edwards, J., concurring). In § 1350 (the ATCA), however, Congress chose to require
only a "violation of the law of nations" to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts. Id. (Edwards,
J., concurring). Given that international law itself does not create a right to sue because that can
only be granted under municipal law, the different wording in § 1350 suggested to Judge Edwards
that Congress fully intended to grant a cause of action for any violation of the law of nations
through § 1350. Id. (Edwards, J., concurring). Presumably, the alternative would have been to
provide a cause of action "arising under" international law as defined by Congress, had Con-
gress meant to so limit the statute. See id. (Edwards, J., concurring).
Additionally, congressional silence in the face of ATCA litigation-the fact that Congress has
not attempted to amend or limit the ATCA in any substantial way since its passage in 1789, even
after the Filartiga decision-suggested to Judge Edwards congressional acquiescence in the
court's current application of the ATCA. Id. at 779-80 (Edwards, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 801-08 (Bork, J., concurring).
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tion of power principles and asserted that deciding whether there was a cause of
action for a particular plaintiff required an analysis similar-but not identical-to
that required by the political question doctrine and act of state doctrine. 124 He
conceded that his conclusion could also have been based, as was Judge Robb's, on
the political question doctrine, but he admitted "[i]t is probably better not to in-
voke the political question doctrine in this case, .. . [because] the contours of the
doctrine are murky and unsettled." 12 5 Thus, Judge Bork conducted one general
survey of separation of power principles and their application to the ATCA. Citing
the factors "'counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Con-
gress"' described in Bivens, Judge Bork emphasized the separation of powers con-
cerns that arise in the field of international relations. 126 In short, to rule on the Tel-
Oren case would require, among other things, a determination of the status of the
PLO, whether PLO attacks on Israel were unlawful, and whether international law
proscribed terrorist acts such as this one, even by non-state actors-subjects that
Judge Bork felt were not within the court's province. 127
Bork made interesting use of the lack of legislative history surrounding pas-
sage of the ATCA. He admitted there was little to no clear indication of the First
Congress's intent, surveyed what little history there is to suggest the statute was
used very narrowly, and then asserted that courts that interpret the statute in a way
that differs from his create "substantive law" and usurp the role of the legisla-
ture. 12 8
[W]hen courts go beyond the area in which there is any historical evidence, when
they create the substantive rules for topics such as that taken up in Filartiga or in
Judge Edwards' formulations, then law is made with no legislative guidance
whatsoever. When that is so, it will not do to insist that the judge's duty is to
construe the statute in order not to flout the will of Congress. On these topics, we
have, at the moment, no evidence what the intention of Congress was. When
courts lack such evidence, to "construe" is to legislate, to act in the dark, and
hence to do many things that, it is virtually certain, Congress did not intend. 129
Although Judge Bork admitted that the statute can be read in at least three ways, he
insisted that to read it in any way but his would amount to legislating. 130 His
124. Id. (Bork, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 803 n.8 (Bork, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 801 (Bork, J., concurring) (discussing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)).
127. Id. at 798-823 (Bork, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 815-16 (Bork, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 815 (Bork, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 804 n.10, 815 (Bork, J., concurring). Interestingly, Judge Bork spent a great deal
of time construing and interpreting the history he admitted was lacking or was ambiguous. He
made speculative statements and selected commentators whose viewpoints reflected his own
without addressing alternative explanations. When discussing the role of individuals in interna-
tional law, for example, he insisted that they have never had more than a "derivative role in the
vindication of their legal rights." Id. at 817 (Bork, J., concurring). This, Bork asserted, stems
from the traditional view that international law applies only to the conduct of states. Id. (Bork,
J., concurring). But in making such statements he ignored the long history of jus cogens viola-
tions, which have held individuals accountable under international law principles for piracy and
slave trading. He also ignored the assertion by many historians that eighteenth century thinking,
in its reverence for the rule of law, presumed individuals were subject to natural law, embodied
in international law. This was the perspective of many of the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention. See generally Dickinson, supra note 101, at 35-37.
reading concluded that the statute covers only a limited set of tort actions by aliens
that do not adversely affect foreign policy. 13 1 His somewhat disingenuous ranting
against judicial activism, however, highlights valid judicial concerns that are height-
ened by the international impact of ATCA decisions. Passing on international law
can result in both domestic and global lawmaking, which raises the stakes and
adds a whole new dimension to the phrase "judicial activism." 132
In the third and final concurring opinion in Tel-Oren, Judge Robb rested dis-
position of the case squarely on the political question doctrine and asserted that
federal courts should not rule on such cases. 133 For the court to even bandy about
a discussion of whether the PLO was a state for purposes of the statute, Robb
observed, was to give the PLO more recognition than the executive branch ever
had, and that alone represented an unconstitutional usurpation by the judiciary of
executive power. 134 For Judge Robb, terrorism presented questions for. which
there existed no judicially manageable standards, and for which courts could not,
in practical fact, exert their power in any meaningful way. 135 After all, what effect
would a court order have on the PLO? Would they willingly submit to discovery
or even acknowledge the power of the court in the first place? Filartiga was a
rather easy case, Robb argued, because there were no objections from either the
U.S. or the Paraguayan governments, and because it did not embarrass any branch
of either government. 13 6 In this case, however, no limiting principles existed that
could be applied to render questions of terrorism and state-recognition judicially
manageable. 137
The Tel-Oren opinions are noteworthy for several reasons. First, the court
placed no weight on the fact that only a few of the victims of the PLO bombing
were American citizens, which would have allowed assertion of jurisdiction at
least under the passive personality principle. Second, all three judges submitted to
a legalistic view of what constitutes a nation-state, such that the PLO could never
meet the standard. This, if extended, means that the PLO and other terrorist orga-
nizations forever remain unaccountable under principles of international law for
atrocities committed on foreign citizens in U.S. courts under the ATCA, and repre-
sents a perhaps understandable naivet6 (given the date the case came down) about
the realities of terrorism. It hints at the parallel naivet6 exhibited when corpora-
tions escape liability because they are non-state actors.
Finally, both Judge Edwards and Judge Bork advanced a "plain meaning" read-
ing of the ATCA but reached vastly different conclusions, suggesting the role each
judge's ideology plays in shaping interpretation of the ATCA. Judge Edward's
plain meaning reading would limit federal jurisdiction under § 1350 to the most
egregious offenses, as he believed the Filartiga court did, despite the fact that the
statute does not expressly limit jurisdiction in this way. Indeed, Judge Bork ac-
cused Judge Edwards of inventing "limiting principles" under the disingenuous
guise of plain meaning in order to minimize his own discomfort with the stat-
131. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 822 (Bork, J., concurring).
132. See discussion of the political question doctrine infra Part III.D.
133. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 824 (Robb, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 825 (Robb, J., concurring).
136. See Id. at 826 (Robb, J., concurring)
137. Id. (Robb, J., concurring).
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ute. 138 Judge Edwards justified this limitation by harkening back to original in-
tent-that the purpose of the statute was to avoid international confrontations by
showing the world, as a young republic, that we were capable of enforcing norms
of international law and were civilized. 139 Judge Bork, on the other hand, con-
cluded that the statute's plain meaning suggested it was only a grant of jurisdic-
tion. He assuaged his own discomfort with that reading by conceding that the
three offenses extant at the time of the First Congress (violation of safe conducts,
infringement of rights of ambassadors, and piracy) could be considered causes of
action under the existing ATCA. 140 Under a plain meaning analysis, this lacks
persuasive force as well. The statute does not mention these three offences; thus,
it is unclear how a plain meaning reading could include them. These obviously are
the only offenses that Judge Bork feels comfortable allowing under the statute.
His competing ideologies-conservatism and textual literalism-compel this con-
clusion.
The attempt to mask policy considerations in statutory construction or doc-
trines of judicial restraint merely hides the true issue: a misunderstanding of the
court's role in the enforcement of international law predicated on underlying as-
sumptions about the distribution of power and the role of the courts. Judge Edwards
conceded to some extent that the forces of power had shifted by supporting the
Filartiga approach, but he could not see beyond the non-state status of the PLO.
Judge Bork would only concede that utterly apolitical offenses or only those that
reify the existing power structure should be cognizable under the ATCA. Judge
Robb rejected the idea that courts could have any say in this type of foreign policy
matter, which, it should be emphasized, is quite different from an ATCA claim
brought against a corporation.
3. Extension to Non-State Actors: Kadic v. Karadzic
In 1995, the Second Circuit extended the ruling in Filartiga to allow suits
against private actors for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 14 1 In
its analysis, the court addressed the state action requirement and the political ques-
tion doctrine. 142 The court concluded that international law dispenses with the
state action requirement in certain circumstances. 14 3 Although Karadzic advanced
the traditionalist line, arguing that international law is only binding on states, the
court rejected this argument, citing a "substantial body of law ... that renders
private individuals liable for some international law violations," namely, piracy,
slavery, and war crimes. 144
The facts of this case were indeed compelling. Radovan Karadzic was Presi-
dent of the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb republic of Srpska, which claimed to
exercise lawful authority and controlled some territory. 14 5 Muslim citizens of
Bosnia-Herzegovina brought suit against him, alleging that he "personally planned
138. Id. at 820 (Bork, J., concurring).
139. See id. at 783 (Edwards, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 813-14 (Bork, J., concurring).
141. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 E3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995).
142. Id. at 244-45, 248.
143. Id. at 239.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 236-37.
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and ordered a campaign of murder, rape, forced impregnation, and other forms of
torture designed to destroy the religious and ethnic groups of Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats."' 14 6 The court found a cause of action for genocide and war
crimes in spite of the fact that Srpska was not an officially recognized state. 147
In addressing the state action requirement, the court liberally cited the Re-
statement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 14 8 Because
the cause of action (whether there is a violation of the law of nations) in ATCA
cases is conflated with the jurisdictional analysis, the Kadic court summoned both
§ 702 and § 404 of the Restatement to support the proposition that some of the
offenses of "universal concern" can be committed by non-state actors.14 9 Section
702 identifies actionable violations of the law of nations committed by a state. 150
These include those violations listed in § 404 as of "universal concern." 15 1 Sec-
tion 404, however, describes those offenses for which a nation-state has universal
jurisdiction, namely, "piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, geno-
cide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism." 152 The cross-over be-
tween these two provisions convinced the court that the offenses listed in § 404
would not require state action. 153 If they are so egregious as to warrant universal
jurisdiction, the court reasoned, they must be violations of the law of nations with
or without state action. 154
The Kadic court conducted a nuanced analysis of the definition of "state"
under international law worth examining. The court recognized that a state under
international law is "an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent popula-
tion, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the
capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities." 155 Further, an
entity can be a "state" for purposes of international law whether or not formally
recognized by other states. 156 International law proscribes official torture, for
example, whether a state is "recognized" or "unrecognized" by other states.157
Thus, whether or not the U.S. government officially recognizes a particular state,
it may be considered a state under international law and for purposes of ATCA
litigation. 15 8 Otherwise, the court noted, "[i]t would be anomalous indeed if non-
recognition by the United States, which typically reflects disfavor with a foreign
regime- sometimes due to human rights abuses-had the perverse effect of shield-
146. Id. at 242.
147. id. at 236-37. The allegations included genocide, rape, forced prostitution and impreg-
nation, torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, assault and battery, sex and
ethnic inequality, summary execution, and wrongful death. Id. at 242.
148. Id. at 240.
149. Id.
150. ld. at 240 n.3.
151. Id. at 240.
152. Id. at 240 n.4.
153. Id. at 240.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 244 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 201 (1986)).
156. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELAXONS LAW OF TEE UNITED STATES § 202
cmt. b (1986)).
157. Id. at 245.
158. Id.
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ing officials of the unrecognized regime from liability for those violations of inter-
national law norms that apply only to state actors." 159 In the final analysis, the
court determined, the inquiry is "whether a person purporting to wield official
power has exceeded internationally recognized standards of civilized conduct, not
whether statehood in all its formal aspects exists." 160 Notable in the corporate
context, the Kadic court also asserted that the "color of law" jurisprudence under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 was a relevant guide as to whether a defendant has engaged in
official action for purposes of ATCA jurisdiction. 16 1
Finally, the Kadic court addressed the political question concerns raised by
the defendant. The court rejected the approach suggested by Judges Robb and
Bork in Tel-Oren, and emphasized the fact-specific inquiry necessary to determine
whether the political question doctrine applied in any given case. 162 The court
reiterated points made in the foundational political question cases,1 63 namely, that
the mere fact these cases raise questions involving foreign relations does not nec-
essarily transform them into nonjusticiable political questions. 164 In essence, Kadic
is "cited for the proposition that the ATCA covers violations of customary interna-
tional law by private, non-state actors." 165
D. The Modern ATCA Framework: Jus Cogens Violations,
the Law of Nations, and State Action Requirements
Human rights cases brought under the ATCA range from those seeking redress
for terrorist attacks, 166 extreme environmental destruction, 167 cultural genocide, 168
arbitrary arrest and detention, 169 forced labor (equated with slavery), 170 murder,
torture and rape. 17 1 Such violations tend to be conjoined, as one type of violation




162. Id. at 249. It is worth pointing out that the executive branch in this case "emphatically
restated.., its position that private persons may be found liable under the Alien Tort Act for acts
of genocide, war crimes, and other violations of international humanitarian law." Id. at 239-40.
That the court had executive branch support clearly made it much easier to reach the conclusion
in this case. See discussion infra Part III.D.2.
163. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
164. See further discussion, infra Part III.D. 1, of the Kadic court's political question analy-
sis.
165. Bridgeman, supra note 16, at 8.
166. See, e.g., Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316
F3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
167. See, supra note 5, for cases in which environmental claims were brought under the
ATCA.
168. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
169. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
170. See, e.g., Sarci v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Ca. 2002); Doe v. Unocal
Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
171. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F Supp. 2d 1116, 1127-28 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
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ample, will likely be accompanied by other. violence and claims of cultural geno-
cide, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and/or murder. 172
Filartiga established that, pursuant to the ATCA, federal courts have subject
matter jurisdiction when three conditions are satisfied: (1) an alien sues, (2) in
tort, (3) committed in violation of the law of nations. Neither the courts nor the
ATCA statute itself indicates who may be sued. The prohibition against the al-
leged offense must be "clear and unambiguous,"' 173 and the international commu-
nity must "have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely several,
concern." 174 The question of whether a corporation may be successfully sued
under the ATCA depends primarily on the alleged offense (must be specific and
universal) and whether the state action requirement applies. 175 Whether an of-
fense against the law of nations even exists can be ascertained from the works of
jurists, academicians and other commentators, as well as international treaties and
conventions articulating accepted universal norms. 176
A hierarchy of harms exists under international law. 177 Whether or not state
action is required depends on which offense is alleged. 17 8 Thus, the worst viola-
tions do not require state involvement to be actionable under the ATCA; the less
egregious harms do require state involvement, since they become violations only
when the added component of state-sanctioned abuses and misuse of governmen-
tal power exists. 179 The worst offenses, known asjus cogens violations, are "binding
on nations even if they do not agree to them," and they are so fundamental that
"the law of any particular state is either identical to the jus cogens norms of inter-
national law, or it is invalid."' 180 For example, the pirate under international law
has been viewed for centuries as the "enemy of mankind."'I81 The pirate invokes
universal condemnation because piracy violates basic notions of an ordered sys-
tem, 182 To commit piracy against anyone, for example, is to commit a crime against
all nations. 183 In addition to piracy, jus cogens violations recognized by U.S.
courts to date include piracy, slavery, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes. 184 Among these offenses, genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes generally must be committed by a state or "under color of state authority,"
pursuant to § 1983 jurisprudence. 8 5 If a violation does not rise to the level of a
172. See generally id.; Holwick, supra note 24. Holwick notes that "human rights and envi-
ronmental non-governmental organizations ... have come to understand that their issues are
inextricably bound on a global scale, and consequently, they have joined forces in an effort to
more closely monitor corporate activities abroad." Id. at 188.
173. Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d at 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
174. Id. at 888.
175. Bridgeman, supra note 16, at 6-9.
176. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F2d at 880.
177. See Bridgeman, supra note 16, at 6-7.
178. See id. at 6.
179. See id. at 6-8.
180. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 WL
31063976, at *11 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002).
181. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2, of piracy and the law of nations.
182. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2, of piracy and the law of nations.
183. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995).
184. Id. at 240 n.4 (quoting REsTATEMENTF (TwnRD) OFTHE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 (1986)).
185. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 239-40.
[Vol. 57:1
2005] THE CORPORATE FACE OF THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT 167
jus cogens violation, a private actor will be liable for other law of nations viola-
tions only when state action exists. 186 Thus, any suit alleging something less than
jus cogens violations, and even those alleging certain of the jus cogens violations,
must allege state action to survive. 187 Individual mass murderers or serial rapists,
therefore, will not be held liable for "war crimes," unless the murders are commit-
ted pursuant to a systematic campaign of terror and murder in pursuit of a state
goal.
There is a certain logic to this somewhat convoluted conceptual scheme. Cer-
tain crimes are simply so horrific that, since Nuremburg, they have been univer-
sally condemned. The horror of World War II led to a consensus that no one-no
nation, person, or other legal entity- should ever be allowed to commit such crimes
with impunity again. Other offenses, such as torture, or arbitrary arrest, and mur-
der, invite international reprobation only if committed under color of state author-
ity. Absent state involvement, that individual or group can be prosecuted in the
courts of that country and the world should entrust prosecution to the local legal
system. However imperfect a country's justice system may be, respect for state
sovereignty supersedes the cries of individuals for justice. Further, it would be a
flatly patronizing undertaking to instruct other countries on how to ensure justice
inside their borders. If that state's government is involved, however, such assump-
tions no longer work. The state action requirement represents an understanding by
the world community that if a government is acting against its own people, even if
its crimes do not constitute genocide or crimes against humanity -its people face
the unique predicament of having no recourse in their own courts. Thus, recourse
in foreign courts is necessary and therefore justifiable.
Because of the difficulty ascertaining exactly what constitutes international
law, causes of action under the ATCA have been narrowly defined.188 Courts
consider (1) whether a specific, universal, and obligatory norm of international
law can be ascertained; (2) whether the norm is recognized by the United States;
and (3) whether plaintiffs sufficiently allege its violation in the complaint. 189 A
court will find a cause of action under the ATCA only if a clear and unambiguous
violation of the law of nations is adequately alleged. 190 Furthermore, breaches of
international law occur only where "the nations of the world have demonstrated
that the wrong is of mutual and not merely several, concern."'19 1 Some courts
have declared that ATCA jurisdiction only applies when a "shockingly egregious
violation[] of universally recognized principles of international law" has oc-
curred. 192 The ATCA itself, of course, does not say who may sue or whether state
action is required, or that the tort alleged must be "shockingly egregious." All
such notions are court-created rules of decision derived from international com-
mon law and based on broad and legitimate justiciability concerns.
THE RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS defines customary international law
as law that results from "a general and consistent practice of states followed by
186. Bridgeman, supra note 16, at 7.
187. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 239.
188. See Mary Elliott Rolle, Unraveling Accountability: Contesting Legal and Procedural
Barriers in International Toxic Tort Cases, 15 GEo. INr'L ENVTL. L. REV. 135, 154 (2003).
189. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
190. Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 145-55 (2d Cir. 2003).
191. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980)).
192. Id. at 167 (quoting Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691,692 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam)).
them from a sense of legal obligation." 19 3 Courts have had difficulty locating and
defining international law, and have been understandably reluctant to apply such
law, unless the prohibition is unequivocal. Courts, therefore, engage in heightened
review of the complaint, examining the origins and evolution of international law
as well as the scant legislative history behind enactment of the ATCA in order to
determine whether a cause of action may be implied from international law. 194
Because no code of international law exists, to locate rules of decision judges
consult the "'works of jurists writing professedly on public law ... the general
usage and practice of nations... [and] judicial decisions recognizing and enforc-
ing that law."' 195 Ascertaining international law, therefore, requires a court to
engage in lengthy, inferential reasoning in order to arrive at general principles of
law from specific treaties, accords, and the practices and expectations of nations.
The district court's opinion in Sarei v. Rio Tinto provides a clear example of a
court struggling to locate and apply the law of nations in an ATCA case brought
against a corporation for environmental and human rights abuses. 196 With regard
to the environmental claims, in particular, Plaintiffs carefully crafted their com-
plaint, aware that intranational pollution alone would not support an international
law claim. 197 They asserted, instead, that massive environmental destruction that
leads to the loss of life violates the "right[] to life and health." 198 Specifically,
plaintiffs alleged that the environmental damage constituted violations of (1) the
principle of "sustainable development," which obliges "state actors to avoid seri-
ous and irreversible environmental ... health effects from development activi-
ties," and (2) "the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
which prohibits" some forms of pollution to marine environments. 199
The court rejected the right to life and health claim founded on principles of
sustainability, citing three primary reasons for its rejection: (1) that the United
States had never signed or ratified the American Convention on Human Rights
(ACHR), cited by plaintiffs as primary support for the universality of the right to
193. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)
(1987).
194. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Flores v. S.
Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116
(C.D. Cal. 2002); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
195. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d at 165 (quoting U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153,
160-61 (1820)).
196. 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Compare with Beanal v. Freepor-McMoran,
Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999), in which Indonesian citizens brought suit against domestic
corporation conducting mining in Indonesia alleging environmental abuses, human rights viola-
tions, and genocide under the ATCA. Id. at 163. The district court granted defendants' motion
to dismiss because the complaint (1) failed to support a claim for international human rights
violations and genocide; (2) then-existing treaties and agreements did not contain specific enough
environmental standards and were thus insufficient sources of international law; and (3) then-
existing conventions, agreements, and declarations failed to identify specific conduct that would
constitute acts of cultural genocide and thus were too abstract/vague to be enforceable under
ATCA. Id. at 165-68.
197. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1155-63.
198. Id. at 1156.
199. Id.
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life; (2) that the ACHR does not specifically address deprivations caused by envi-
ronmental degradation; and (3) that plaintiffs failed to point to a "specific, univer-
sal, and obligatory" environmental norm under international law.200 The court
also rejected the sustainable development claim under UNCLOS because it could
not "identify the parameters of the right created by the principle of sustainable
development. '20 1 In short, the right was not well-defined and therefore was unen-
forceable under the ATCA, reinforcing the underlying notion that admittedly de-
sirable policy goals should not necessarily be transformed into "rights."
However, although the United States had not ratified UNCLOS (it has only
signed it), the court noted that 166 nations had ratified it, and therefore, in spite of
U.S. reservations, it represented the law of nations. 202 Surveying U.S. case law
interpreting UNCLOS, the Restatement of Foreign Relations, and a law review
article, the court concluded that UNCLOS reflected customary international law
and plaintiffs could therefore base an ATCA claim upon it.20 3 Rejecting defendant's
arguments that UNCLOS required the exhaustion of local remedies and mandated
dispute resolution in another forum, the court held that the treaty requirement did
not foreclose litigation under the ATCA.204 The Sarei opinion emphasized the
specificity of the violation,20 5 and the number of countries that had signed a treaty,
and whether the United States was among them in both signing the treaty and
enforcing the right.20 6
III. ATCA LITIGATION IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT:
EARLY DISMISSALS AND COMPLEX LITIGATION
Kadic opened the door for human rights cases to be brought against corpora-
tions under the ATCA. From these cases, there emerge two basic questions that
courts ask at the jurisdictional threshold-one legal and one prudential: (1) Can
this violation be committed by a private actor under international law? (legal); and
(2) if so, would it be reasonable to try that private actor here in the United States?
(prudential). Whether the court chooses to focus on the first or the second ques-
tion may depend on how uncomfortable it is with the policy considerations inher-
ent in the decision. It is easier to declare there is no legal violation under interna-
tional law (i.e., no cause of action), than to declare that the court should refrain
from ruling on the case out of deference to the political branches or fear that a
foreign nation's sovereignty will be compromised.
However, corporations are less likely to commit the handful of traditional in-
200. See id. at 1156-60.
201. Id. at 1160-61.
202. Id. at 1161.
203. Id. at 1161-62. The Sarei court cited the following sources to support its contention that
UNCLOS was binding on the United States even though unratified: United States v. Alaska,
503 U.S. 569 (1992); Mayaguezanos por la Salud y el Ambiente v. United States, 198 F.3d 297
(1st Cir. 1999); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 312(3) (1987); R.M.S. Ti-
tanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943 (4th Cir. 1999); Carol Elizabeth Remy, Note, U.S. Territorial
Sea Extension: Jurisdiction and International Environmental Protection, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1208, 1211-12 (1993). Id. at 1161.
204. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1162 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
205. Id. at 1132; see also Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 154 (2d. Cir.
2003) ("[T]he principle must be more than merely professed or aspirational.").
206. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d at' 1156-63.
ternational law violations (piracy, war crimes, and genocide) that can be applied to
private actors. Indeed, "the more challenging inquiry is how corporations may be
found liable under the ATCA if their conduct falls outside the 'handful of crimes'
category but still violates international law. ' 207 When conduct falls outside these
highest tier violations, the question for the courts becomes whether the state action
alleged meets the requirements of whatever standards of collusion the court chooses
to apply.208 It is when these crimes are alleged-torture, violation of the right to
life (environmental), etc. - that the vacuum of the "state action requirement" plays
itself out and ultimately underscores the court's application of the old paradigm,
even in the modern context of private, commercial litigation. Specifically, when
state action is alleged, many other doctrines of judicial restraint are brought to bear
and the courts summon multiple devices to kick these cases out of federal court.
Indeed, the very fact that individual liability forjus cogens violations is the excep-
tion to the general rule that states are the true subjects of international law, high-
lights the belief in outdated understandings of the distribution of power in the
global context.
A. Barrier 1: Limited Liability
The complexity of the TN corporate form adds another layer to the analysis at
the preliminary stages of ATCA litigation. Courts must consider the relationship
between the corporation against whom the suit has been brought-usually a parent
company over which the court has personal jurisdiction -and the subsidiary cor-
poration located in the plaintiff's home country where the harm is alleged to have
occurred. According to a recent Supreme Court decision, "[ilt is a general prin-
ciple of corporate law deeply 'ingrained in our economic and legal systems' that a
parent corporation ... is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries." 209 Indeed,
"[t]he law allows corporations to organize for the purpose of isolating liability of
related corporate entities." 210 Parent companies may be involved in the supervi-
sion of the subsidiary without incurring liability; appropriate involvement of the
parent company in the subsidiary's business includes "'monitoring of the
subsidiary's performance, supervision of the subsidiary's finance and capital bud-
get decisions, and articulation of general policies and procedures."' 2 11 In corpo-
rate ATCA cases, courts must examine the level of involvement of parent compa-
207. Bridgeman, supra note 16, at 8-9.
208. Although it seemed clear to the Kadic court that § 1983 "color of law" standards should
apply to ATCA cases, in the current Unocal case before the Ninth Circuit en banc, the primary
question before the court is which standard of vicarious liability to apply-the standard under
domestic federal law, state law, or the "aiding and abetting" standard under international crimi-
nal law. Unofficial Hearing Transcript, Doe v. Unocal, F.3d _ (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 00-
56603, 00-56628, 00-57195, 00-57197) [hereinafter Unocal Hearing Transcript] (anticipated
decision in 2004) available at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/enbanctranscript.doc (last vis-
ited Apr. 11, 2004); see also Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on
Phase I at 13, n.9, Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., ...._F. Supp. 2d_._ (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23,
2004) (No. C 99-25061 SI) [hereinafter Chevron Texaco Order] (explaining procedural posture
in Unocal case), available at http://www.earthrights.org (PDF file) (last visited Apr. 11, 2004).
209. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51,61 (1998) (quoting Douglas & Shanks, Insula-
tion from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE LJ. 193 (1929)).
210. Chevron Texaco Order, supra note 208, at 3 (citing Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d
1357, 1362 (10th Cir. 1993)).
211. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 72 (quoting Lynda J. Oswald, Bifurcation of the
Owner and Operator Analysis Under CERCLA, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 225,282 (1994)).
(Vol. 57:1MAINE LAW REVIEW
2005] THE CORPORATE FACE OF THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT 171
nies in the operations of their foreign subsidiaries in order to assess whether joint
action sufficient to constitute complicity in unlawful activity exists. The first step,
then, is to show the defendant/parent corporation is directly or indirectly liable for
the unlawful actions of its foreign subsidiary.
Doctrines employed to analyze the liability of a parent corporation include:
piercing the corporate veil, integrated enterprise liability, agency-based liability,
aiding and abetting, and ratification. 2 12 Piercing the corporate veil and related
doctrines represent "attempts to balance the benefits of limited liability against its
costs." 2 13 Whether to hold a parent liable for the acts of its subsidiary is a fact-
based inquiry, and the general rule is to respect the corporate form "unless to do so
would work an injustice upon innocent third parties. '2 14 While the tests fluctuate
somewhat in different districts, the Ninth Circuit has shown willingness to pierce
the corporate veil when "the separate identity of the corporation has not been re-
spected and that respecting the corporate form would work an injustice on the
litigants. '2 15 Under the integrated enterprise liability theory, courts impose less
stringent requirements on plaintiffs, but only apply this theory to enforce specific
federal statutes.2 16 If an agency relationship between the parent and subsidiary
can be shown and plaintiffs show the agent was acting within the scope of author-
ity granted by the parent, liability under agency theory may attach. 217 In a recent
ATCA case, Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., the court denied defendant's sum-
mary judgment motion because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
the parent, Chevron Corporation, was: (1) the agent of its partly-owned subsidiary
in Nigeria alleged to have committed human rights abuses; (2) whether the parent,
Chevron, aided and abetted the subsidiary's collusion with the Nigerian military;
and (3) whether the parent, Chevron, ratified the behavior of its subsidiary by
212. Chevron Texaco Order, supra note 208, at 4-5.
213. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & D ,Ni. R. FiscnEL. THE EcoNoMic STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAw 55 (1991). Easterbrook and Fischel also point out that courts are generally more willing to
pierce the corporate veil and allow creditors to reach the assets of corporate as opposed to per-
sonal shareholders. Id. This, they note, is consistent with economic principles, because it "does
not create unlimited liability for any investor." Id. at 56. Furthermore, "the moral-hazard prob-
lem is probably greater in parent-subsidiary situations because subsidiaries have less incentive
to insure." Id. at 56-57.
214. Chevron Texaco Order, supra note 208, at 5. The Chevron Texaco court quoted Judge
Cardozo in a footnote, observing that '-[tihe whole problem of the relation between parent and
subsidiary corporations is one that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor. Metaphors in law
are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslav-
ing it."' Id. at n.4 (quoting Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926)). As with
assumptions about the international power structure, assumptions entrenched in the fiction of
the corporate form may, in fact, be limiting the ability of courts to recognize abuses of authority
and lawless behavior when they see it and to regulate accordingly.
215. Id. at 7 (citing RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543,596 (9th Cir. 1985)).
216. Id. at 7-8.
217. Id. at 9-10.
To establish actual agency a party must demonstrate the following elements: "(1)
there must be a manifestation by the principal that the agent shall act for him; (2) the
agent must accept the undertaking; and (3) there must be an understanding between
the parties that the principal is to be in control of the undertaking."
Id. at 10 (quoting Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc. v. Chemical Bank, 119 B.R. 416, 422 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
various actions after the alleged crimes were committed.2 18 The court rejected
plaintiff's alter-ego theory because there was "no evidence to support a finding
that incorporation was undertaken in bad faith or that observing the corporate form
would achieve an inequitable result."'2 19
B: Barrier 2: State Action Requirement
In addition to protections inherent in the corporate form, the state action re-
quirement also protects against successful prosecution of ATCA cases against cor-
porate defendants. In many ways the "color of law" analysis affirmed in Kadic
parallels the parent/subsidiary joint action analysis in that it involves assigning
unlawful actions to an entity (the state) that only indirectly caused the actual harm.
United States courts have determined several "color of state law" tests under fed-
eral § 1983 claims: (1) the "nexus test"; (2) the symbiotic relationship test; (3) the
"joint action test"; and (4) the "public function test."'220 The "joint action test"
requires either a conspiracy or willful participation with the state actor, or "a sub-
stantial degree of cooperative action between the state and private actors." 22 1 In
ATCA cases, de facto liability of a private actor is generally found where "formal-
ized relations between state entities and private corporations" existed.222
1. Doe v. Unocal
Doe v. Unoca1223 was the first ATCA case brought against a corporate defen-
dant.224 It required the courts to wrestle with parent/subsidiary liability questions
and color of law questions in the corporate context.22 5 In 1996, Burmese villagers
brought suit against California-based Unocal, the Federation of Trade Unions of
Burma, and the National Coalition Government for violations of forced labor,
murder, rape, and torture committed by the Burmese military.226 Plaintiffs alleged
the abuses were committed in furtherance, and for the benefit, of Unocal's pipeline
218. Id. at 7-23.
219. Id. at 21.
220. Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1304 (S.D. Fla. 2003)
(citation omitted).
221. Id. (citation omitted).
222. Id. at 1305.
223. No. 00-56603, 00-57197, 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. Sept. 18,
2002).
224. Recent ATCA Cases Against Corporate Defendants, EarthRights International, at http:/
/www.earthrights.org/litigation/recentatcacases.shtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2004).
225. Id. Other recent ATCA cases against corporate defendants include: Aguinda v. Texaco,
Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cit. 2002); Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2001);
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co.,
No. 01-3203-Civ., 2003 WL 1846195 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2003); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petro-
leum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). Id. See also George C. Wilson, Operation Iraqi Lawsuit,
NATIONAL JOURNAL, GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE MAGAZINE, Nov. 3, 2003, available at http:/f
www.govexec.com/news/index.cfm?mode=report2&articleid=26983&printerfriendly (last vis-
ited Nov. 2, 2004) (outlining the view of David J. Scheffer, visiting professor at Georgetown
University Law Center and President Clinton's Ambassador-at-Large for war-crimes issues, that
the companies involved in the current occupation of Iraq are vulnerable to suit for exploiting the
oil wealth of the country in violation of international occupation law).
226. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976, at * 1.
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project. 227 The state actors were dismissed from the case under the banner of
immunity, and the district court, in a consolidated action, granted Unocal's motion
for summary judgment on the ATCA claims, holding that the plaintiffs had not
shown that Unocal had either engaged in state action or controlled the Myanmar
Military. 228 In a panel ruling, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding
that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether Unocal was liable for
aiding and abetting the Burmese military in its commission of human rights viola-
tions.229 Subsequently, in February 2003, the Ninth Circuit granted a rehearing en
banc. 230 Oral arguments were heard in July 2003 and focused exclusively on the
issue of whether federal courts should apply an international law aiding and abet-
ting standard or a general federal common law tort standard of liability.23 1 On
December 9, 2003, the circuit court ordered the case withdrawn from submission
pending issuance of the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.232
The Ninth Circuit panel concluded that slavery, torture, and murder were vio-
lations of the law of nations, that rape was a form of torture, and that forced labor
was synonymous with slavery.2 33 The court also found that these violations-
forced labor, murder, torture, and rape ("second tier crimes")-required state in-
volvement in order to be actionable. 234 The court noted that only if second tier
crimes were committed in furtherance of "first tier crimes" (slavery, piracy, war
crimes, or genocide) could they attach to private actors not acting in collusion with
a country's government.235
The court also examined the parent/subsidiary liability issue. It was clear that
Unocal had used all available means to distance itself from operations in
Myanmar.236 To develop the country's energy resources, the military dictatorship
in Myanmar established, in 1988, a state-owned oil and gas company (Myanmar
Oil). 237 In 1992, Myanmar Oil licensed the French oil company Total S.A. (Total)
to produce, transport, and market natural gas from deposits found off the coast of
Myanmar in a place known as the "Yadana Field."'238 Total formed a subsidiary,
Total Myanmar Exploration and Production (Total Myanmar), to complete this
project.239 The project required a joint venture to achieve both extraction of the
natural gas and transportation of that gas to market in Thailand.24° Unocal and its
wholly owned subsidiary, Union Oil Company of California, acquired a twenty-
227. Id. at *3-6.
228. id. at *7.
229. id. at *24.
230. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628, 2003 WL 359787 (9th Cir. Feb. 14,
2003).
231. See EarthRights International Resource Center: Doe v. Unocal, available at http://
www.earthrights.org/unocal/index.shtml (last modified October 6,2003) [hereinafter EarthRights:
Doe v. Unocal].
232. Chevron Texaco Order, supra note 208, at 14, n.9. See discussion of Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, supra note 12.
233. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976, at *8.
234. Id. at *9.
235. Id.






eight percent interest in both the extraction and transportation portions of the project,
and set up two more wholly-owned subsidiaries to hold Unocal's twenty-eight
percent interest in the joint venture-the Unocal Offshore Co. and the Unocal In-
ternational Pipeline Corp., respectively.24 1 Myanmar Oil and a Thai government
entity also purchased interests in the project, making both the Myanmar and Thai
governments financially invested in the success of the project. 242 Total Myanmar
(the French company) was appointed operator of the extraction and transportation
joint venture. 24 3 As operator, Total Myanmar was responsible for personnel mat-
ters connected with the operation. 244
In determining liability, the Ninth Circuit focused on whether Unocal knew
that the Burmese military provided security and other services for the project (state
action), and whether Unocal knew that the military was committing human rights
violations in connection with the pipeline project (the subsidiary's action), facts
that had to be proven for liability to attach. 245 Unocal argued that it was not liable
because the Burmese military, and not Unocal employees, committed the abuses.246
"The company asserted that as a 'passive investor' in the pipeline, totally removed
from decisions or activities related to forced labor, it could not be held liable."'247
The en banc court, in its recent oral arguments, focused on which standard of joint
action to apply-aiding and abetting under international criminal law or joint actor
liability under domestic law-zeroing in on how much control or active involve-
ment on the part of the parent corporation must be shown in order for color of law/
state action liability to attach to the parent.248 Commentator and lead attorney for
plaintiffs, Terry Collingsworth, observes, "The Unocal case raises many questions
about the ability of corporations to disassociate themselves from the direct conse-
quences of their investment choices. ' ' 249
This case makes clear that once a court concedes that the cause of action al-
leged by plaintiffs is valid under international law, it then asks three questions: (1)
what law applies-domestic, international, or the law of the country in which the
alleged harm occurred; (2) did this corporate defendant exert enough control over





245. Id. at* 1-15.
246. Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement Mecha-
nisms, 15 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 183, 188-89 (2002). In this article, Collingsworth conveys the
genesis of the Unocal case as purely serendipitous. 1d. at 187. The General Secretary of the
Federation of Trade Unions of Burma, U Maung Maung, had escaped Burma and was living in
Thailand, where he read a Reader's Digest article about a couple in the United States who suc-
cessfully sued a veterinarian for malpractice for over-anesthetizing their dog. Id. U Maung
Maung was aware of the reports of atrocities connected with the Unocal pipeline project in
Burma, and, notes Collingsworth, was "both amused and angered that the United States legal
system" could provide a remedy for bereaved pet owners while looking the other way as human
atrocities were committed by a U.S. subsidiary with U.S. investment dollars and with the appar-
ent acquiescence of a U.S. based company. Id.
247. Id. at 189.
248. Unocal Hearing Transcript, supra note 208.
249. Collingsworth, supra note 246, at 189.
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trol, was there sufficient state collusion to hold this parent corporation liable for
violations of second tier torts under international law?
2. Sarei v. Rio iinto PLC
In the recent district court case Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC,250 the plaintiffs al-
leged personal injury, massive environmental destruction, cultural genocide, tor-
ture, and murder during the course of a ten-year civil war on the island of
Bougainville, Papua New Guinea (PNG), instigated, they alleged, by mining op-
erations conducted by Rio Tinto Limited and Rio Tinto PLC.25 1 Rio Tinto PLC, a
British corporation, and Rio Tinto Limited, an Australian corporation (Rio Tinto
Group), were part of an international mining group headquartered in London that
operated over sixty mines and processing plants in forty countries worldwide, in-
cluding the U.S. 2 52 During the 1960s, the Rio Tinto Group chose to pursue mining
operations in the village of Panguna, on the island of Bouganville, PNG, which
required the displacement of local villages and the relocation of indigenous popu-
lations.253 Rio Tinto Group collaborated initially with the colonial government of
Australia and later continued its operations through a relationship with the inde-
pendent government of PNG.254 As with Myanmar Oil in the Unocal case, the
PNG government negotiated a substantial interest (19.1%) in the operation. 255
Plaintiffs alleged that the money from mining operations became a major source of
income for the government and "'provided [an] incentive for the PNG government
to overlook any environmental damage or other atrocities Rio committed.' '256
They also alleged that this turned the copper mine into a joint venture and allowed
Rio Tinto Group to operate under color of state authority.257
Initially, Rio Tinto Group created, and maintained a majority interest in, a
subsidiary, Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL), as a means to hold its interest in
the mine. 258 The Australian Colonial Administration then gave BCL leases for
over 12,500 hectares of Bougainvillean land, and the PNG government signed the
Mining Act of 1974 with BCL, which, in part, regulated waste disposal from the
mine and vested authority for such regulation in the PNG government. 259 Island-
ers opposed the building of the mine, and when they refused to surrender their
lands to the BCL, riots ensued and the PNG military was called to defend the
mine's interests. 260
250. 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
251. Id. at 1120.
252. Id. at 1121.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1121-22. "PNG was a colony of Australia until 1975." Id. at 1121, n.14.
255. Id. at 1121. This practice of involving local governments as business partners is typical
in natural resource development projects. As the plaintiffs pointed out in Sarei, this inevitably
raises a conflict of interest for the local government and puts them in a position of dependence
on the foreign company. This, in turn, compromises the government's ability and/or desire to
protect its citizens in the face of corporate abuses. This fact favors adjudication in a foreign
forum (such as a U.S. court). Individual human rights can thereby be enforced without reliance
on a government lacking clean hands.
256. Id. (alterations in original).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. ld. at 1121-22.
260. Id. at 1122.
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Eventually, the mine was completed and remained in operation for decades. 26 1
It was tremendously profitable, both for Rio and the PNG government. 262 Mining
processes soon destroyed the environment upon which the local populations relied
for their livelihood; the mine produced more than one billion tons of waste, much
of which was dumped into the island's river system.26 3 Air quality plummeted,
villagers contracted respiratory illnesses, and the virtual destruction of the envi-
ronment rendered the native population desperate, depressed, and prone to alcohol
abuse.264 Residents accused Rio Tinto Group/BCL of, among other things, sys-
tematic racism and unrestrained chemical dumping.265 The plaintiffs alleged that
BCL's mining operations "ripped apart the culture, economy, and life of
Bougainville. 266
In the end, the local population took up arms to close the mine.267 Rio threat-
ened to pull out of the country if conditions were not quelled, and the PNG govern-
ment came to its defense. 268 A ten-year civil war ensued.269 Throughout the war,
plaintiffs alleged continuous human rights violations by the government's military
forces, including the imposition of a blockade preventing food and medical sup-
plies from reaching the island (causing, plaintiffs claimed, at least 10,000 civilian
deaths), "aerial bombardment of civilian targets, wanton killing and acts of cru-
elty," and inhuman and degrading treatment of civilians.2 70 The war officially
ended in 1999, but the devastation, according to plaintiffs, was nearly complete.27 1
The land was "ravaged," and thousands of local Bougainvilleans had died.272 Some
of the remaining population suffered severe health problems, and "an estimated
67,000 live[d] in 'care centers' or refugee camps."'273
The complaint alleged "crimes against humanity; war crimes/murder; viola-
tion of the rights to life, health, and security of the person; racial discrimination;
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; violation of international environmental
rights; and a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights," as well as
state law claims for "negligence, public nuisance, private nuisance, strict liability,
equitable relief, and medical monitoring." 274 Plaintiffs argued that because the
mine was a joint venture with the PNG government, and because Rio Tinto's threats
led PNG to use force, Rio could be held accountable for the atrocities committed
by the PNG military.275
261. See id. at 1122-23.
262. Id. at 1121.
263. Id. at 1123-24.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1124.
266. Id. (quoting First Amended Complaint 9 155).
267. Id. at 1125.
268. Id. at 1125-26.
269. Id. at 1126.
270. Id. at 1126-27 (quoting First Amended Complaint f 203).




275. Id. at 1128.
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Rio Tinto argued it did not act jointly with PNG to commit the atrocities. 276
The court disagreed (upon defendant's motion to dismiss), finding that the com-
plaint alleged joint action sufficient to support a finding of vicarious liability.
277
The company could thus be held liable for actions taken by the PNG government
and the PNG Defense Force (PNGDF). In reaching its conclusion, the court sur-
veyed the Unocal cases, Kadic, and several Supreme Court cases involving color
of law claims.27 8 The court stated that there "must be some nexus between the
wrongful act and the private entity," and "the conduct of the state [must be] 'fairly
attributable' to the private party before state action can be found."' 279 The court
also observed, citing Kadic, that certain violations of the law of war are of univer-
sal concern and do not require state action.280
In the end, the following allegations by the Sarei plaintiffs were sufficient to
support a finding that PNG's actions were fairly attributable to Rio: (1) BCL's
Chief Executive Officer threatened to withdraw if the PNG government did not
take care of the disturbances on Bouganville, knowing "that its wishes were taken
as commands by the PNG government and Rio intended that its c6mments would
spur the PNG forces into action"; 28 1 (2) Rio knew it had "a great deal of control
over the situation" and had Rio insisted that military action not be taken, the PNG
government would have complied;282 (3) certain meetings occurred in which Rio's
agents encouraged imposition and continuation of the blockade, and at all times
PNG understood Rio's "encouragement" to be a command; (4) the PNG govern-
ment and its soldiers acted as the agent of Rio; and (5) that the mine was a joint
venture between Rio Tinto and PNG.283 In short, the complaint was well-pleaded,
and the court appeared willing to allow discovery on these issues.
The court also concluded, applying a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 analysis,284 that the
276. Id. at 1142. Defendants also argued that a blockade was not a war crime. The court
flatly disagreed, finding that the civil war constituted an armed conflict and therefore the Geneva
Conventions applied. Id. at 1140-41. The decade-long blockade, therefore, was a violation of
the Geneva Convention mandates regarding the treatment of civilians in wartime. Id. at 1141.
277. ld. at 1149.
278. id. at 1143-48.
279. Id. at 1146 (citing Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 838 & n.5
(9th Cir. 1999)). The court also found this test to be consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling
in Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). Id. at 1147.
280. See id. at 1139-40 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1995) and
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424,444-45 (D.NJ. 1999)). The Sarei court also
cited a law review article, that argued "'[i]f a corporation commits piracy, slave trading, geno-
cide, or war crimes, then it may be held liable under the ATCA even absent state action."' Id. at
1140 (quoting Developments in the Law: International Criminal Law, 114 HAtv. L. REV. 1943,
2037 (2001)).
281. Id. at 1148 (citing the First Amended Complaint 185).
282. Id. at 1148 (citing the First Amended Complaints 186).
283. Id. at 1149 (citing The First Amended Complaint 11 4, 223).
284. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Analogizing to the color of state law jurisprudence under § 1983, the Sarei court concluded that
plaintiffs had made out a case that Rio was a de facto state actor for purposes of the racial
discrimination claim. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.
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plaintiffs pled a sufficiently close nexus between PNG and Rio to make out a claim
for racial discrimination. 285 The Ninth Circuit held that alleging "something more"
than mere private conduct is sufficient to move forward with a racial discrimina-
tion claim, and in this case that "something more" included the fact that PNG
made its eminent domain powers available to Rio so that it could construct the
mine, earned profits from the mining activities, and took no steps to "control or
minimize the negative impact of Rio Tinto's mining operations" on the indigenous
population.286
3. Suggested Changes to the Standard of Liability for
Transnational Corporations (TNs)
Unocal and Sarei highlight the complexity of claims against TNs. Determin-
ing whether the company acted jointly with the host state is complicated. First,
courts must examine the corporate form and principles of limited liability to deter-
mine how far up the chain of corporate ownership to attach liability, and whether
veil piercing would be appropriate. This requires reviewing the doctrines designed
to circumvent limitations on liability. The question in Unocel was whether the
California-based parent company had enough control over its subsidiary to be held
liable for the human rights abuses, though it retained only a twenty-eight percent
passive interest in the project after it had given the French company Total Mynamar
control of the pipeline construction? The question in another case against Texaco
was whether a U.S.-based parent company exercised enough control over its fourth-
tier Ecuadorian subsidiary to be held liable for its subsidiary's actions. 287 The
underlying question in these cases is clear: How far up the chain of ownership can
and should a TN's liability extend? If the defendant is found to have exercised
enough control over its subsidiary's actions, the court must then determine whether
there was sufficient collusion between the corporation and the local government to
fulfill the state action requirement. To determine whether violations attributed to
the corporation were state-sanctioned, a court will examine the joint venture and/
or partnership agreements (usually involving profit-sharing) that companies estab-
lish with host country governments. 28 8
As would be expected, these agreements are also structured to minimize cor-
porate liability. Given the instability in some developing countries, it is under-
standable that TNs would seek to distance themselves from foreign-based subsid-
iaries. But the logic for this cloak of limited liability-originally established to
minimize shareholder liability (for corporate debts) and thereby encourage risk-
taking and entrepreneurship-was devised in the United States under a procedur-
285. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F Supp. 2d at 1154.
286. Id. at 1154-55.
287. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002) (dismissing an ATCA claim on
FNC grounds and holding that a suit against Texaco should be brought in Ecuador in part be-
cause all relevant operations occurred in Ecuador and were controlled by Texaco Inc.'s fourth-
tier subsidiary located in Ecuador). See also Brief ofTexaco at 16-19, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.,
303 E3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002) (No. 97-9102) (explaining the distance between Texaco and its
Ecuadorian subsidiary). TNs purposefully distance themselves and create multiple layers of
liability protection between the corporate headquarters and subsidiaries operating in developing
countries. This makes it difficult for plaintiffs to reach the parent companies, which hold most
of the company's assets, and represents a huge obstacle to obtaining damage awards:
288. See, e.g., cases cited, supra note 225.
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ally transparent system with respect for the rule of law. It is important to ask,
therefore, whether the justification for limited liability-thickened by layer upon
layer of wholly- and partly-owned subsidiaries as well as joint ventures across
multiple countries and differing legal systems-extends so readily to TNs. Courts
and commentators have already recognized that strict adherence to the impenetra-
bility of the corporate form makes less sense when the shareholders are corpora-
tions rather than individuals. 289 Perhaps it is also time to recognize that in the
international context there is even less justification for maintaining the cloak of
limited liability in its present form.
This is not to suggest limited liability should be done away with. Duties of
companies in the international context can and should be heightened, however,
given the known risks in foreign direct investment projects and the foreseeability
of problems when investing in countries with questionable human rights and envi-
ronmental records. This is an instance wherein, as Justice Cardozo observed, the
metaphor of the corporate form no longer liberates thought but enslaves it.290 It is
worth reflecting on the fact that in most ATCA cases involving corporate defen-
dants, "the victims are from developing countries-developing not only economi-
cally but also in terms of the level of education, legal regulations, and legal institu-
tions that the countries have achieved." 29 1 The courts in these countries, further-
more, may be "'ill-equipped to handle [these] cases or the host government will
not pursue enforcement against the perpetrators"' because they themselves are
also implicated in the alleged violations. 292
Furthermore, accountability depends on openness and a free press. 293 The
fact that these abuses are generally occurring in repressive societies highlights the
probable inability of the host country to either expose or enforce the violation.
Milton Friedman's famous insistence that "'the social responsibility of business is
to increase... profits,"' depends upon the premise that in pursuing profits busi-
nesses will ultimately do the right thing because the public will demand it.294
This, however, presupposes a free society. "If the media are unable to report on
abusive behavior, there will be no public relations consequences of corporate bad
acts."'295 Thus, when courts defer to the right and authority of the host country to
prosecute harms against its own people, they are often ignoring that (a) the country
may be collaborating with the company in causing the harm, and (b) the wider
public may not know about the harm because the press does not have open access
to government and/or corporate records. Therefore, the sort of organic process of
public pressure on bad corporate actors often cannot, and will not, occur.
ATCA litigants ask the United States to participate in the international system
in ways that most prior U.S. administrations have supported-namely, to advance
289. See EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 213, at 56, text and accompanying discussion.
290. See Chevron Texaco Order, supra note 208, at 5 n.4, text and accompanying discussion.
291. Surya Deva, Human Rights Volations by Multinational Corporations and International
Law: Wherefrom Here?, 19 CONN. . lr'L L. 1, 9 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
292. Id. at 6-7 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Anita Ramasasty, Corporate Complicity: From
Nuremberg to Rangoon-An Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Li-
ability of Multinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 91, 92 (2002)).
293. Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights,
20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45, 62-63 (2002) [hereinafter Stephens, The Amorality of Profit].
294. Id. at 62 (quoting Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase
Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970).
295. Id. at 63.
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human rights abroad. 29 6 They also force courts to recognize the power wielded by
TNs and to change their thinking about the system as a whole. The analysis forces
confrontation with the diminished power of the nation state in the globalized con-
text. ATCA litigation asks courts to scrutinize actions of the partners and subsid-
iaries of TNs with some tie to the U.S. in order to rectify both first and second tier
offenses against international law-offenses that the world community has resound-
ingly denounced. Although asserting norms of corporate responsibility for "viola-
tions of human dignity.., challenges the state's exclusive prerogative (what some
might call sovereignty) to regulate business enterprises by making them a subject
of international scrutiny; it makes them entities that have their own duties to re-
spect human rights." 297 Such explicit application of these norms to corporations
is precisely what should be done. Corporations are "entities" of a new sort. They
are not private persons. They are not governments. They are immensely powerful
(often more so than governments) yet highly unregulated. This, however, has al-
ways been met with resistance, primarily due to the old understanding of power
relationships and the infusion of that assumption into doctrines of judicial restraint.
In this context, however, territorial sovereignty should take on diminished impor-
tance, particularly given the fact that complicity in official state action is generally
required, "a fact which seriously hampers the possibility of making the involved
[TN] liable under the national regulatory mechanism." 298 In short, if the host
country is involved in the violations, how likely are they to prosecute their part-
ners in crime or tort?
Courts hearing ATCA human rights claims against TNs, therefore, could le-
gitimately impose a higher duty on U.S. parent corporations that are part of a
transnational network of companies. A heightened duty to know of the actions and
policies of their foreign subsidiaries in the field of human rights would compel
businesses to build in systematic inquiries into the activities of foreign subsidiar-
ies, and allow the courts to more honestly balance the true interests of the parties
(profits and sensitivity to the world economic system versus human life and dig-
nity) when corporations are sued. Such a heightened duty would begin to unravel
the limited liability web corporations spin, and increase enforceability of universal
human rights norms. This would be accomplished by simply shifting the burden to
the corporation to show that it did not know and could not have known about the
abuses -thus making a critical step toward curing the phenomena of willful igno-
rance allowed by the insulated corporate form. Given the well-established record-
keeping and oversight procedures in large corporations, such monitoring should
not prove difficult.
296. I do not hold a naive faith in the veracity of official government statements with regard
to foreign affairs, but I do want to underscore what the public position has been. Given public
acceptance of international human rights, by definition, suits in federal courts to enforce inter-
national human rights norms that the executive branch has embraced would not in any way
embarrass the executive branch-even if the U.S. is simultaneously conducting clandestine op-
erations that undermine those rights. Thus, the concern courts have over either contradicting theofficial stance of the administration or embarrassing the executive branch is misplaced.
297. Ratner, Corporations, supra note 16, at 540.
298. Deva, supra note 291, at 8.
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C. Barrier 3: Dismissals on Forum Non Conveniens Grounds
Before raising the more problematic specter of judicial restraint doctrines,
corporate defendants in ATCA suits frequently move to dismiss ATCA claims on
forum non conveniens grounds. When such motions are granted, courts often mask
the rationale in technical, rule-bound doctrines of court procedure. In the end, the
forum non conveniens analysis becomes a procedural gloss on a basically substan-
tive decision about judicial power. While this is an important part of the court's
analysis, courts tend to conflate forum non conveniens with prudential doctrines
and thereby obscure the analysis used to dismiss plaintiff's claims. Often the most
interesting thing about these cases is "the way in which the courts review[] the
forum non conveniens issue, scrutinizing not only the interests of the parties and
the forums, but the political sovereignty concerns of the states as well." 299
The ATCA, unlike the Torture Victim Protections Act, 300 does not require
exhaustion of local remedies before bringing a claim.30 1 Claims, therefore, may
theoretically be brought in U.S. courts before plaintiffs have attempted litigation
in the country where the alleged violations occurred. Much of the time, courts are
examining forum non conveniens claims knowing that litigation in the host coun-
try has not been initiated. The sense that they are usurping the authority of another
sovereign state to try these cases, therefore, is always near the surface of the forum
non conveniens analysis. In wrestling with the question of whether Peru's courts
were an adequate alternative forum, Senior District Judge Haight observed, "an
American court will refrain from condemning as inadequate a legal remedy af-
forded by the courts of another nation unless it appears that such remedy is 'so
clearly inadequate that it is no remedy at all."' 302 As Judge Haight points out, the
standards that the foreign forum must meet to be considered "adequate" are woe-
fully low, largely because of the political and prudential considerations that have
crept into the forum non conveniens analysis.
Any forum non conveniens analysis requires application of a two-prong test.
First, the court must determine the adequacy of the alternative forum recommended
by the defendant. 303 If the alternative forum is deemed adequate, the court pro-
ceeds further in its analysis and weighs both the private and public interest factors
299. Rolle, supra note 188, at 165.
300. See discussion, infra Section II(A), of the passage of the Torture Victims Protection Act
and its connection to the Alien Tort Claims Act.
301. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). The TVPA Amendment expressly requires exhaustion of
all local remedies before suit may be brought in the United States. Id. The ATCA contains no
such exhaustion requirement. Id.
302. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 253 F Supp. 2d 510,539 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,254 (1981)). In an exhaustive and thoughtful survey of the
FNC arguments presented by the parties, Judge Haight spent considerable time reviewing the
improvements made to the Peruvian judicial system since Fujimori's regime had been ousted.
Id. at 538. He noted that both parties agreed that under Fujimori the system was utterly corrupt
and justice would not have been forthcoming. Id. However, after examining the competing
expert opinions Judge Haight relied on the rather low bar set by the Second Circuit- "the Sec-
ond Circuit has in a number of forum non conveniens decisions cautioned district courts against
blanket condemnation of the adequacy of another nation's courts"-and found Peru's courts
were an adequate alternative forum. !d. at 538-39.
303. Id. at 531 (quoting Bank of Credit and Commerce Int'l (Overseas) Ltd. v. State Bank of
Pak., 273 F.3d 241,246 (2d Cir. 2001)).
to determine if, in fact, the adequate alternative forum makes practical sense.304
Private interest factors include practical trial-specific concerns, such as access
to evidence, the availability of a means to compel witnesses to testify, the cost of
getting witnesses to testify, and the possibility of viewing and testing relevant sites
where damage has allegedly occurred. 30 5 "Public interest factors," while related,
include the concerns of the public in the country and region in which the trial will
be held.306 Courts look at "local interest in the controversy, court congestion,
avoidance of unnecessary problems in application of foreign law, and the avoid-
ance of imposing jury duty on residents of a jurisdiction having little relationship
to the controversy." 30 7 Unlike in domestic forum non conveniens challenges, choice
of law considerations do not weigh heavily in a forum non conveniens analysis
involving foreign defendants. 30 8 Courts presumptively favor the plaintiff's forum
choice and place the burden of proving its inadequacy on the defendant. 30 9 How-
ever, courts give less deference to a foreign plaintiff's forum choice,3 10 except in
cases where the U.S. has signed a treaty with a plaintiff's home country that ac-
cords its nationals equal access to our courts. 3 11 The presumption favoring the
plaintiff's choice of forum loses force in ATCA cases in part because the plaintiffs
are not U.S. citizens.
The existence of a claim under the ATCA does not alter the forum non conve-
niens analysis. 312 Such dismissals are often premised, however, on the condition
that the defendant corporation submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court and/or
to broader U.S. style discovery requirements even though they would not be re-
quired to do so under the law of the alternative forum. 313 Because the standard of
review for a dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds is abuse of discretion,
these lower court decisions are rarely overturned. Notably, environmental claims
brought under the ATCA "have generally been dismissed by U.S. courts on [forum
non conveniens] and comity grounds." 3 14 This author knows of only one case to
304. Id.
305. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Rolle, supra note 188, at 160.
309. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 101-03 (2d Cir. 2000).
310. Id.
311. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 547 (S.D.N.Y 2001) (citing Blanco v.
Banco Indus. De Venez., S.A., 997 F.2d 974, 981 (2d Cir. 1993)).
312. Id. at 553 (noting that "nothing in [the] text [of the ATCAJ suggests that the United
States forum should.., be given preference over a more convenient foreign forum which is
adequate to handle the case").
313. See generally Rolle, supra note 188 (comparing forum non conveniens in the United
States, Canada, England, South Africa, Australia and the European Union as well as veil-pierc-
ing law in the United States, Germany and England).
314. Jeffrey B. Gracer, Protecting Citizens of Other Countries, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
JusncE: THEoIaEs AND PROCEDURES To ADDRESS DISPROPORnONATE RISK 727-28 (Michael B. Gerrard
ed., 1999). In a footnote, Gracer includes this useful summary of the case law:
See Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming
dismissal of toxic tort suit brought by 700 Peruvian citizens against copper com-
pany); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), aff'd in part, modified in part, 809 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 871 (1987) (affirming dismissal of 145 consolidated actions against Union Car-
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date in which an appeals court has overturned a forum non conveniens dismissal of
an ATCA claim.315 In that case the court reversed and remanded the dismissal of
a claim against Pfizer brought by citizens of Nigeria for the use of human subjects
in Nigeria for purposes of pharmaceutical research. 316 The court considered sev-
eral factors in its dismissal, and remanded to resolve a dispute over whether a
parallel case, raising virtually the same claims, had just been dismissed in Nige-
ria.3 17 If the district court on remand were to find that this case was parallel and
had been dismissed, this would provide the rare, concrete evidence of the foreign
state's unwillingness to adjudicate what the U.S. court believed was a legitimate
claim.3 18
In Sarei v. Rio 7into, the plaintiffs also survived defendant's forum non conve-
niens motion.3 19 Applying the traditional forum non conveniens tests, the court
found that PNG provided an adequate alternative forum because the plaintiffs'
claims were cognizable in PNG. 320 The court found that the unavailability of
class actions and contingency fee counsel, as well as constraints on discovery, did
not render PNG an inadequate forum.32 1 However, PNG failed the second prong
of the forum non conveniens test, because the relevant private interests, specifi-
cally the fact that "PNG was plaintiffs' wartime adversary for more than a decade,
and that defendants were allegedly aligned with PNG in prosecuting the war,"
counseled in favor of plaintiffs' forum choice. 322 The court also found that al-
though two of the four public interest factors counseled against retaining the suit,
overall they did not "tip sharply in favor of the alternate forum."323 The fact that
jury duty would be imposed on citizens far removed from the dispute and that the
court would have to apply PNG law in some instances, did not outweigh the
countervailing concerns over the congestion in PNG courts and the choice of law.324
That the U.S. court would mostly be applying international law-rather than PNG
law-helped convince the court that retention of the suit was proper.325 The court
also accepted plaintiffs' contention that their human rights claims would not be
cognizable in Australia, 326 defendant's fallback forum should the court find PNG
inadequate. Ultimately, this suit, while successfully breaking the forum non con-
veniens barrier, was dismissed as a nonjusticiable political question. 3 27
bide arising from catastrophic leak of methyl icocyanate in Bhopal, India); Delgado
v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (dismissing actions brought by
farmworkers from twenty-three foreign countries alleging chemical exposure);
Sequihua v. Texaco, 847 F Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (dismissing suit by residents of
Ecuador alleging massive air, soil, and water contamination).
Id. at 739 n.78.
315. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., Nos. 02-9223(L), 02-9303 (XAP), 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
20704, **11 (2d Cir. Oct. 8, 2003) (vacating and remanding the district court's dismissal of
ATCA claims on FNC grounds; no further case history is available).
316. Id. at **3, **11.
317. Id. at **6-**9.
318. Id. at **7.
319. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116,1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
320. Id. at 1164-75.
321. Id. at 1170.
322. Id. at 1174 (citing Jane Doe I v. Karadzic, 866 F Supp. 734, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
323. Id. at 1174-75.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1175.
326. Id. at 1176.
327. Id. at 1208-09.
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Conversely, in Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal
of ATCA claims on forum non conveniens grounds but modified the order to insist
the defendants agree to submit to the jurisdiction of Ecuadorian courts, regardless
of an Ecuadorian law that would haveallowed them to claim otherwise. 328 In
Aguinda, the court considered and rejected four arguments raised to counter
defendant's challenge: (1) Ecuador was not an adequate forum because it did not
recognize tort claims; (2) Ecuador did not allow class action lawsuits and did not
recognize the equitable relief plaintiffs were seeking; (3) certain procedural re-
quirements made the process in Ecuador slow, cumbersome, and overcomplicated;
and (4) Ecuadorian courts were biased and incapable of rendering an impartial
verdict.329 Taken cumulatively, the plaintiffs argued, such factors rendered the
forum inadequate. The court rejected plaintiffs' arguments, finding the following
factors persuasive in reaching its conclusion: (1) other individuals harmed by
Texaco's drilling activities had successfully sued Texaco in separate lawsuits in
Ecuador already; (2) the government of Ecuador could be joined as a party in
Ecuador (the drilling was a joint venture between the government and Texaco and
was allegedly controlled by the government); and (3) the multiple causation issues
that arose over large geographic areas in Ecuador would best be tried in the loca-
tion where the alleged violations occurred. 330 The parties also argued over sub-
stantive and procedural Ecuadorian law and the impact that it would have on the
case. 33 1
In the end, the court found the following evidence dispositive of the forum
non conveniens dismissal: (1) that there was no evidence of impropriety on the
part of Texaco or the Ecuadorian judicial officials; (2) that Ecuador was hearing
cases against multinationals and no accusations of corruption had arisen in those
cases; (3) the attempted military coup in 2000 had failed, which, to the court, reaf-
firmed Ecuador's commitment to democratic institutions; and (4) other recent U.S.
cases had held that Ecuador was "an adequate alternative forum. ' 3 32 The court
conceded that even the State Department called "Ecuador's legal and judicial sys-
tems . . . 'politicized, inefficient, and sometimes corrupt,"' yet it simultaneously
insisted that these characterizations were only applicable to cases involving clashes
between the police and political protestors. 333 The court also placed heavy em-
phasis on the fact that Texaco was four times removed from the alleged violations,
involved only via a fourth-tier subsidiary, TexPet. 334 TexPet was not made a party
to the suit, and almost all violations occurred in Ecuador.335
By pointing this out in its analysis, the court conflated the question of corpo-
rate liability and Ecuador's territorial sovereignty with the forum non conveniens
328. 142 F Supp. 2d 534, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). See also Rolle, supra note 188, at 154-57,
for an extended discussion of the many cases against Texaco that were ultimately consolidated
into the Aguinda case and dismissed.
329. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F Supp. 2d at 539-43.
330. Id. at 544-46. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' contention that the lack of a class
action mechanism-a uniquely American creation-in Ecuador rendered the Ecuadorian forum
inadequate. Id. at 540-41.
331. Id. at 542-43.
332. Id. at 544-45.
333. Id. at 545.
334. Id. at 548.
335. Id.
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analysis. This was inappropriate, particularly when, as here, the question of a
parent corporation's liability is so complex. A cursory examination of the appear-
ance of objectivity and due process in the alternative forum, when that forum is
supported by the very government alleged to be colluding with the corporation
committing the crimes, fails to keep the forum non conveniens arguments analyti-
cally distinct from other prudential and political concerns. Had the court made
these conceptual distinctions more carefully, the evidence of bias in Ecuador's
judicial system may very well have convinced the court that a U.S. court was the
proper forum.
In ATCA cases, judges "tend to presume that foreign courts are competent to
adjudicate disputes arising within their national territories."'336 Generally, how-
ever, these cases are brought after many years of horrific abuses, during which
time the local government has usually not taken steps to regulate the corpora-
tion.337 Otherwise, the case would not need to be brought in the United States.
But reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of a foreign sovereign infuses the
analysis even at the forum non conveniens stage, and serves as a harbinger of
prudential doctrines to come, should the plaintiff prevail on the forum non conve-
niens arguments. Dismissal on "procedural" grounds is less controversial than the
political question and other prudential doctrines. Thus, while the burden is sup-
posed to rest with the defendant to overcome the presumption in favor of plaintiff's
forum choice, courts in ATCA cases tend to work a subtle burden shift. This shift
requires the plaintiffs to demonstrate the inadequacy of the alternative forum-
rather than insisting, consistent with the usual analysis, that defendants show both
the adequacy of the alternative forum and the public and private interest factors
weighing in favor of the alternative forum.
D. Barrier 4: The Political Question Doctrine
1. Background
The political question doctrine was first sketched in Marbury v. Madison.33 8
Chief Justice Marshall distinguished between legal duties and political questions,
by proclaiming that the only restraint on an individual's right to redress a legal
wrong is the Constitution. 339 However, when a "discretionary" function is at is-
sue, Marshall reasoned, the legal wrong can be subsumed and the acts of the ex-
ecutive would thus be "only politically examinable. '340
Writing for the Court in Baker v. Carr, Justice Brennan described the political
question doctrine as elusive, and conceded that "in various settings" its elements
"diverge, combine, appear, and disappear in seeming disorderliness."' 34 1 Yet in
Baker, the Court outlined the analytical framework for courts when determining
whether a given claim presents a nonjusticiable political question. A given suit
may present a political question if: (1) the matter is constitutionally committed to
336. Gracer, supra note 314, at 728.
337. See Deva, supra note 291, at 7-8.
338. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
339. Id. at 166.
340. Id.
341. 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
a coordinate branch of government; (2) no "judicially discoverable and manage-
able standards" exist to guide the court's analysis; (3) it is impossible to decide the
case without making an initial policy determination that should rightfully be made
by a separate branch; (4) deciding the case would express "a lack of respect" to a
coordinate branch of government; (5) there is "an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made"; or (6) the potential embarrass-
ment to the U.S. government could arise as a result of "multifarious pronounce-
ments by various departments on one question."'34 2 Questions impacting foreign
relations present unique challenges because such questions often "demand [a] single-
voiced statement of the Government's views."'343 Yet, Brennan cautioned, "it is
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies
beyond judicial cognizance." 344 When confronted with foreign relations ques-
tions, Brennan directed courts to examine the history of the particular issue pre-
sented and then look to see if it was susceptible "to judicial handling" and to con-
sider "other possible consequences of judicial action."' 345 This is vague guidance
at best, but it is necessarily vague because of the complex questions on multiple
levels raised by these cases. Such close scrutiny is necessary to justify a court's
intervention or nonintervention in sensitive cases. Although courts should not
blindly defer to the executive in such cases, deference is appropriate when national
security decisions or matters requiring singular pronouncements arise.346
This reasoning was echoed and applied in the ATCA case Kadic v. Kardzic.347
The Kadic court looked at the six Baker factors and concluded that the first three
factors (textual commitment to a coordinate branch, lack of judicially manageable
standards, and the danger of making policy determinations) did not apply because
Filartiga created manageable standards ascertainable by reference to international
law.348 Furthermore, the ATCA itself expressly committed enforcement of inter-
national law to the judiciary. 349 As to factors four through six, the Kadic court
asserted their relevance "only if judicial resolution of a question would contradict
prior decisions taken by a political branch in those limited contexts where such
contradiction would seriously interfere with important governmental interests."350
Thus, in the ATCA context, the critical inquiry involves whether a given ruling
would upset, embarrass, or enrage a sovereign nation, or embarrass the executive
by contradicting or undermining its foreign policy statements. While ATCA claims
342. Id. at 217.
343. Id. at2ll.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 211-12.
346. Id. Subsequent to Baker, Justice Brennan's dissent in Goldwater v. Carter emphasized
what he viewed as the narrowness of the political question doctrine. "Properly understood," he
asserted, "the political-question doctrine restrains courtsfrom reviewing an exercise of foreign
policy judgment by the coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has
been 'constitutional[ly] commit[ted]."' Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F2d 774, 797
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1006 (1979)) (emphasis added).
Where there has been no exercise of that judgment and no pronouncement as to U.S. policy,
according to Brennan, the judiciary should hear the case. See id. There is a difference indeed
between a political question, on the one hand, and a nonjusticiable political question, on the
other. See id.
347. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
348. Id. at 249.
349. Id.
350. Id.
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can raise political questions, the Kadic court affirmed that many foreign relations
questions are examinable by the judiciary. 351 "Indeed," observed Judge Edwards
in Tel-Oren, "the Supreme Court has at least twice cited [the ATCA] as a statutory
example of congressional intent to make questions likely to affect foreign relations
originally cognizable in federal court."'352 So the question becomes, when does a
given case only "touch" foreign relations (and therefore remain justiciable) so sig-
nificantly that it "seriously interfere[s] with important governmental interests"?
What judicial standards guide-or should guide-courts in making this determi-
nation?
2. The Impact of Executive Statements of Interest in ATCA Cases on Justiciability
The Bush Administration and the business lobby tend to portray the potential
economic impact of ATCA litigation as intertwined with U.S. foreign policy.3 53
Thus, the subject of international human rights is often swallowed by the false
equation of stable state relationships with a productive world economy.354 As a
result, the distinction between public and private actors breaks down, and the as-
sumed importance of economic prosperity to global stability becomes the bridge
linking private actors with national and sub-national governments. Foreign states,
as well as our own government, thereby conflate TNs with the state, and the corpo-
ration is necessarily thrust into the larger political and diplomatic arena. Such
conflation theoretically should help ATCA plaintiffs prove state action when that
is required. However, by proving state action, plaintiffs prove too much, often
assuring dismissal of the case as a political question precisely because the foreign
nation is so intimately involved with the TN defendant. Once in the larger politi-
cal/foreign relations arena, many question the judiciary's competence to make well-
informed decisions. Although some do believe the judiciary is as competent to
punish human rights violators as the political branches, 355 restraint doctrines none-
theless often justify dismissals of ATCA human rights claims. 356 Unfortunately,
few clarifying principles emerge from these cases that would guide future courts in
their analysis. Courts have thus come to rely on court-solicited opinions of the
executive branch in ATCA cases. 357 However, as one commentator notes, "[i]f
federal courts grant undue deference to executive positions concerning [ATCA]
351. Id. at 249-50.
352. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 790 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,427 (1964) and Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-30 & n.6 (1942)).
353. See generally Letter to the Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor to the U.S. State Department,
July 29, 2002, available at http://www.lchr.org (last visited Nov. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Taft
letter].
354. See id.
355. See Brian C. Free, Comment, Awaiting Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.: Advocating the Cau-
tious Use of Executive Opinions in Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation, 12 PAc. RIM L. & POL'Y J.
467 (2003).
356. See generally Nat'l Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D.
329 (C.D. Cal. 1997). The State Department filed in the district court a Statement of Interest
asserting that "'at this time adjudication of the claims based on allegations of torture and slavery
would not prejudice or impede the conduct of U.S. foreign relations with the current govern-
ment of Burma."' Id. at 335 (citation omitted). The question of state action resolved in the
plaintiff's favor, id. at 360-61, and there is a consolidated appeal currently pending before a
Ninth Circuit en banc court regarding proper standard of corporate liability. Doe v. Unocal
Corp., No. 00-56603, 00-56628, 2003 WL 359787 at * 1 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2003).
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suits, the executive branch will be able to effectively dictate which international
claims may be heard by U.S. courts. ' 35 8 Indeed, the executive branch has filed
amicus briefs in eight ATCA cases in the last 23 years, and its current position
flatly contradicts the views it expressed in Filartiga.359 Just as the relationship
between globalization, human rights, and environmental violations has become
apparent, 360 the Justice Department has reversed course and sought to undo the
Filartiga interpretation of the ATCA. 361
A joint memorandum of the State and Justice Departments filed during the
Carter Administration in the Filartiga case (Memorandum) stated, "[like many
other areas affecting international relations, the protection of fundamental human
rights is not committed exclusively to the political branches of government. ' 362
The Memorandum also declared, "there is little danger that judicial enforcement
will impair our foreign policy efforts. To the contrary, a refusal to recognize a
private cause of action in these circumstances might seriously damage the cred-
ibility of our nation's commitment to the protection of human rights."'36 3 The
Filartiga court never raised the political question doctrine, likely because it knew
that both political branches supported its reading of the ATCA. Referencing both
"the express foreign policy of... [the U.S.] government" and various treaties, the
Filartiga court comfortably applied international human rights law norms to the
foreign defendant on behalf of a foreign plaintiff.364
The current Bush Administration, however, while pronouncing support for
the advancement of human rights, believes that other interests supersede individual
enforcement via ATCA litigation, even when only corporate actors are sued.365
Given differing interpretations and policies of successive administrations, if judges
357. See id. at 476 n.64. "Statements of Interest are authorized under the Attorney General's
statutory power 'to attend to the interests of the United States' in pending federal or state suits."
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2000)).
358. Id. at 469.
359. U.S. Brief in Unocal, supra note 11, at 6-9.
360. Herz, supra note 16, at 548. Herz, a lawyer for EarthRights International and counsel in
the Unocal case, argues that as Third World economies open to foreign direct investment it
becomes clear that no effective mechanism is in place to ensure corporate accountability for
environmental abuses, and that environmental abuses may in fact violate international human
rights norms. Id. at 545-49. "The fact that governments and TNCs often comnit brutal civil
rights violations, such as summary executions and torture, to suppress opposition to ecologi-
cally destructive projects strengthens the trend toward viewing environmental degradation itself
as a human rights abuse." Id. at 549.
361. See Opposition Brief to the DOJ at 2, nn.2-3, Doe v. Unocal, F_ .3d - (9th Cir. May
2003), available at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/index.shtml (describing the various posi-
tions taken by the Justice Department since 1980 and the differences between the positions of
the State Department and Justice Department). In Filartiga and Kadic, the Justice Department
supported the exercise of jurisdiction; in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, Trajano v. Marcos,
and Alvarez v. U.S. the Justice Department opposed the exercise of jurisdiction in ATCA cases.
Id.
362. Memorandum for the United States Submitted to the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), published in 19 I.L.M. 585, 603
(1980).
363. Id. at 604 (emphasis added).
364. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F2d 876, 884-85 (2d Cir. 1980). The court cited 22 U.S.C.
§ 2304(a)(2) and 22 U.S.C. § 2151(a) as examples of the government's foreign policy specifi-
cally concerning human rights. Id. at 885 n.17. Section 2304(a)(2), quoted by the court, states
that "'[except under circumstances specified in this section, no security assistance may be pro-
vided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations
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allow such opinion letters to carry a lot of weight in their justiciability determina-
tion, the law will evolve according to the politics of any given administration-an
influence that the doctrine of separation of powers seeks to avoid. The question
then becomes, what weight should be given to these executive opinions?
First, it is important to look at what weight these opinions are actually given in
current ATCA cases. Statements of interest have been filed in at least nine ATCA
cases to date. 366 The Carter Administration supported plaintiffs in Filartiga, and
the Clinton Administration supported plaintiffs in Kadic and Unocal. By contrast,
the Bush Administration has registered its opposition to the justiciability of ATCA
claims in six cases, including the Doe v. Exxon Mobil and Doe v. Unocal cases. 367
Doe v. Exxon Mobil involved allegations of knowing collusion with the Indonesian
military in human rights abuses to further Exxon Mobil's operations in Indone-
sia. 368 A trial would have unavoidably implicated the Indonesian military, even
though the government of Indonesia was not itself being sued. 36 9 In a diplomatic
communiqud from Indonesia's Ambassador to the United States, the Ambassador
rejected the authority of a U.S. court to adjudicate the behavior of "an Indonesian
government institution.., for operations taking place in Indonesia."' 370 He failed
to acknowledge that Indonesia itself was not on trial (Exxon Mobil was), but be-
cause of the unavoidable "color of law" analysis, Exxon's liability was directly
tied to its complicity, or lack thereof, with the Indonesian military, which by defi-
nition meant that the actions of the Indonesian military would be scrutinized.
Nonetheless, Taft attached this letter to his letter to the court and highlighted
the economic considerations and his concern over prosecuting the war on terror.371
of internationally recognized human rights."' Id. The congressional findings under § 2151(a),
also quoted by the court, declare:
[t]he Congress finds that fundamental political, economic, and technological changes
have resulted in the interdependence of nations. The Congress declares that the indi-
vidual liberties, economic prosperity, and security of the people of the United States
are best sustained and enhanced in a community of nations which respect individual
civil and economic rights and freedoms.
Id.
365. Taft letter, supra note 353. See also Free, supra note 355, at 473. "In contrast to
previous administrations," notes Free, "the George W. Bush Administration has aggressively
employed executive opinions to defeat § 1350 litigation." Id. Free further expresses concern
that the Sarei case, in particular, raises concerns about the weight given to these executive opin-
ions. Id. at 477. See also Melody Saint-Saens & Amy J. Bann, Using National Security to
Undermine Corporate Accountability Litigation: The Exxon Mobil v. Doe Controversy, 11 U.
MIAM!i lrr'L & CoMp. L. REV. 39 (2003) (examining the Doe v. Exxon Mobil case in depth and
exploring the recent shift in U.S. foreign policy outlined in the Taft letter).
366. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F3d 232, 250 (2d. Cir. 1995); Nat'l Coalition Govern-
ment of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 340 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
367. See Free, supra note 355, at 468-70 (discussing Complaint for Equitable Relief Dam-
ages at Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (No. 01-1357) (D.D.C. filed June 20,2001) (plaintiffs, eleven
villagers from Aceh, Indonesia, charged Exxon Mobil with human rights violations, including
extrajudicial killing, torture, and crimes against humanity, at the hands of the Indonesian mili-
tary hired by Exxon Mobil to provide security for its natural gas facilities)).
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Letter from Soemadi B.M. Brocodiningrat, Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia to
The Honorable Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, July 15, 2002, attachment to the
Taft letter, available at http://www.lchr.org (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
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Human rights abuses, Taft reasoned, are minimized when governments are stable,
and stability depends to a great extent on economic growth. 372 Thus, the more the
U.S. government could do to support foreign governments as they attempted to
stabilize-including by implication, looking the other way on human rights viola-
tions in the short term-the more it would be supporting human rights in the long
term. 373 Suits under the ATCA were counterproductive, Taft reasoned, because
they undermined long-term human rights policies by risking corporate divestment
in developing countries. 374 This divestment would result ultimately in a weak-
ened economy and greater instability. 375 Adjudication of these cases would "preju-
dice the Government of Indonesia and Indonesian businesses against U.S. firms
bidding on contracts in extractive and other industries.' ' 376 In addition, if lawsuits
proceeded against the wishes of the host country, U.S. relations with the country
could be negatively impacted.377 This, in turn, would diminish U.S. influence
over that country's policies and harm the United States in two ways: first, by
decreasing diplomatic influence over human rights issues, and second, by decreas-
ing Indonesia's willingness to cooperate in fighting the "war on terror."' 37 8 Thus,
Taft concluded, (paradoxically) that all comes full circle: a suit brought in the
name of human rights would backfire and result in diplomatic and economic re-
gression rather than progress. 379
In Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, another Statement of Interest filed by Advisor Taft
focused exclusively on the diplomatic concerns raised by an ATCA suit. In its
opinion, the Sarei court had conveyed outrage at the injuries suffered by the plain-
tiffs and conceded that plaintiffs had adequately alleged several causes of action
under international law, yet in the end the case was dismissed,380 Both sides were
handed a pyrrhic victory in that case. For the first time, an environmental claim-
violation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)-
was found to be cognizable under international law.381 Furthermore, the court
found that the ATCA did not require exhaustion of local remedies before suit could
be brought in the U.S., 38 2 that joint private-state action was sufficiently pleaded,
and the forum non conveniens motion must be rejected as to both PNG and Austra-
lia.383 This was all good news for ATCA plaintiffs. The political question doc-
trine, however, ultimately barred adjudication of the case. 384 This was very good









380. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
381. Id. at 1162.
382. Although the Sarei court acknowledged that international law requires exhaustion of
local remedies, the court found that the plain language of the ATCA does not contain an exhaus-
tion requirement. Id. at 1138-39. This is an ironic conclusion. The plain language of the ATCA
mandates that courts apply international law, yet here, the court uses a plain language construc-
tion to conclude that an embedded principle of international law does not apply. Id.
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news for corporate defendants. Defendants raised the possibility that the fragile
cease fire that had been recently negotiated between PNG and the Bougainville
insurgents would be threatened were the Sarei case to proceed. 38 5 They further
argued, based only on general statements made by then Secretary of State Madeline
Albright after a 1998 visit to PNG, that "official" U.S. policy was to support "the
territorial integrity" of PNG, and insisted plaintiffs' claims would negatively im-
pact U.S.-PNG relations.386
Unwilling to accept press conference statements as official U.S. policy, the
Sarei court requested a Statement of Interest from the State Department. 387 In a
September 31, 2001 letter-notably, 20 days after the September 11 terrorist at-
tacks-Taft insisted that the Sarei lawsuit "would risk a potentially serious ad-
verse impact on the [Bougainville] peace process, and hence on the conduct of
[United States] foreign relations."388 The Sarei court refused to entertain plaintiff's
offer of proof to counter the State Department's assertion regarding the negative
effects on the PNG peace process, arguing that when the State Department submits
its foreign policy position it is not for the court to "assess whether the policy ar-
ticulated is wise or unwise, or whether it is based on misinformation. '389 The
court indicated that it was free to take "judicial notice" of such pronouncements
from the executive branch,390 but it did not articulate what taking "judicial notice"
meant or whether such notice bound the court. In the end, the Sarei court found
that "the key inquiry for the court's purpose [was] whether there [would] be an
impact on the United States' foreign relations"-not how much.39 1 Neither the
court nor the plaintiffs could point to any case in which a lawsuit was permitted to
proceed in the face of such unequivocal objections by the State Department. 392
This, the Sarei court concluded, was "probably because to do so would have the
potential to embarrass the executive branch in the conduct of its foreign rela-
tions." 39 3 The lesson? Ask and ye shall receive: if a court asks the Bush Admin-
istration for an opinion, it will likely get an answer that will compel dismissal of
the suit.
Although the persuasive authority of such statements remains unarticulated,
their persuasiveness to courts in ATCA cases is clear. In the two landmark ATCA
cases, Filartiga and Kadic, the executive branch supported application of the ATCA
and the court ruled for plaintiffs. The Sarei court, noting that the plaintiffs failed
to show any other case that had proceeded in the face of express opposition by the
383. Id. at 1129-78.
384. Id. at 1208-09.
385. Id. at 1178-79.
386. Id. at 1179.
387. Id. at 1180-81.
388. Id. at 1181 (quoting an attached letter from Mr. Taft to the Attorney General's Office that
was enclosed with the Statement of Interest filed with the Sarei court by the Attorney General
(acting on behalf of the Department of State)).
389. Id. at 1182.
390. Id. at 1182-83 (citing multiple sources as a foundation for the court's taking judicial
notice of the government's official policy and opinion without having to recognize the underly-
ing facts at the motion to dismiss phase).




State Department, essentially conceded that dismissal rested almost entirely on the
opposition expressed in the Statement of Interest. Given the impact these state-
ments have, the question becomes to what extent should the now express opposi-
tion of the Bush Administration determine the court's analysis of the political ques-
tion doctrine, and at what point would the court's deference to those opinions vio-
late the very Constitutional principles of separation of powers the court is trying to
honor by soliciting them in the first place. 394 In the end, "[i]f courts ... practice
unquestioning adherence to executive communication, they would enable
politicization of the judiciary." 395
In Appellants' Reply Brief in the Unocal case, plaintiffs argued that the Jus-
tice Department possesses no special expertise in the interpretation of the ATCA,
and because the question is one of statutory construction, the authority to construe
the ATCA rests with the judicial branch.396 Plaintiffs argued that courts do not
defer "when the interpretation offered by the government is inconsistent with the
facial requirements of the statute or plain legislative intent, especially if the
government's interpretation changes over time."'397
The uses by the judiciary of State Department opinions as well as other ATCA/
political question cases demonstrate an inappropriate derogation of judicial power
to the executive branch. Because courts view their involvement in foreign matters
as more dangerous (i.e., political) than in the domestic context, disparate articula-
tions of the political question doctrine have emerged. 398 As one commentator
notes:
[High stakes in the international context are different from high stakes in the
domestic context to the extent that the implication of third parties (read: foreign
countries) beyond our control greatly magnifies the risk of error.... In the
international context, the commission of the error can, at least in theory, spark a
chain of events taking the matter out of our hands, so that the damage is irretriev-
able. And in the international context that damage has been, as a historical mat-
ter, potentially severe. 399
This unpredictability in the international context underlies the deference paid to
the executive in ATCA claims, and courts vigorously defend the importance of the
political question doctrine, even in the face of "sustained attack by the commenta-
tors." 400 The very fact Statements of Interest are requested underscores judicial
confusion (or reticence) in the face of these claims. Unfortunately, the Statements
do not necessarily speak to the proper legal response under domestic and interna-
tional law, but reflect instead the political philosophy of a given administration.
3. A New Look at the Political Question Doctrine
394. See Mont. Wilderness Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 496 F. Supp. 880, 884 (D.
Mont. 1980), for the proposition that although executive opinions "are given great weight...
[they are] not binding on this court."
395. Free, supra note 355, at 484.
396. See Opposition Brief to the DOJ at 5-6, Doe v. Unocal, - F.3d __ (9th Cir. May
2003), available at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/index.shtml.
397. Id. at 5.
398. See Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIo ST. L.J.
649, 677 (2002).
399. Id. at 678.
400. Id. at 676 (citation omitted).
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It should not be taken lightly that the political question doctrine reverses the
normal constitutional presumption in favor of judicial review,40 1 and such a rever-
sal may no longer be warranted-at least not in its present form.40 2 Given that the
global community is willing to recognize individual rights grounded in natural law
and to codify those rights in treaties and domestic legal structures, the argument
that courts should avoid adjudication of a case because of the potential for embar-
rassment on the world stage is less persuasive than it once was.40 3 So too, is the
insistence that each branch of the U.S. government must speak with one voice.40 4
With the spread of economic cooperation and democracy, foreign nations increas-
ingly understand the independence of various branches of government, because
they either maintain a similar separation of powers in their own system, or they are
exposed to such governments on a regular basis.40 5 Consequently, the idea that
pronouncements from the judiciary will embarrass the executive, or will lead for-
eign governments to presume that the executive holds the same position and there-
fore impose sanctions, or, in the worst case, start a war against the U.S., is less
persuasive than it once was.406 These ideas rest on the presumptioh that the over-
riding (or only) concern of international law is with inter-state relationships and
their ability to (a) prevent war and (b) promote commerce. As the international
reality shifts, however, so too must the paradigm governing these prudential doc-
trines- accounting for interdependence among the branches, the separation of
powers, and the increased understanding nations have of democratic forms of gov-
ernment and the importance of separation of powers. Separation of powers prin-
ciples themselves "prevent the executive branch from mandating which cases fed-
eral courts may hear."'407
a. A Changed World Must Change the Political Question Doctrine
In his article Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, Peter Spiro
forcefully argues for the compromise required by balancing foreign relations con-
cers and individual rights to shift in favor of individual rights in light of the changes
produced by globalization.40 8 He points to three broad phenomena that suggest
this shift is long overdue: (1) the "increased institutionalization of interstate rela-
tions;" (2) "the disaggregation of the nation-state;" and (3) "heightened interna-
tional economic competition." 409 He encourages the legal community to catch up
with other disciplines and to come to terms with the ways in which globalization
impacts core legal thinking, including the way we interpret the Constitution. 4 10
As to the first phenomena, for most of history, nation-states confronted one
another in a hostile world, in a "proto-anarchical arena characterized by only the
401. Id. at 675-76.
402. Id. at 675.
403. See id. at 678.
404. Id. at 681-82 (quoting United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
405. Id. at 683.
406. See id. at 682-83.
407. Free, supra note 355, at 467.
408. See Spiro, supra note 398, at 677.
409. Id. at 649.
410. Id. at 652.
loosest constraints on self-interested behavior."4 11 Today, however, interstate re-
lations are increasingly governed by "rationalized institutional processes." 4 12 With
the increase in world governing bodies, such as the World Trade Organization, the
United Nations and others, interstate relations have taken on a more structured,
controlled character that has created greater stability and decreased the need for
war.4 1 3 Many nations have shown themselves willing to submit to alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms.4 14 In the past, despite the costs of war, countries
have been willing to wage war when the benefits of a successful campaign out-
weighed the costs. However,
[ilnstitutionalization reduces the cases in which resort to force passes this cost/
benefit test. If states are willing to submit to dispute-resolution processes, the
incentive to use force dissipates. At least among states that accept institutional-
ization, an end to uncabined armed conflict ensues. This occurs (perhaps counter-
intuitively) even as the overall stakes implicated by global governance regimes
increase. 415
While Spiro recognizes the real threat of terrorism and the dangers still re-
maining, he distinguishes this threat from the threat of war in the traditional sense.4 16
The idea of a nation-state becomes irrelevant in the terrorism context, and the
"very notion of a war front" becomes obsolete.4 17 Terrorism, he notes, "ultimately
reduces to a kind of criminal activity" and can thereby be addressed with a "law
enforcement model."' 4 18 Indeed, an international consensus has emerged condemn-
ing terrorist activity as contrary to international law. By contrast, the pre-global-
ization, pre-terrorism world was characterized by the Cold War, and the Cold War
problems could hardly have been conceptualized or solved using a law enforce-
ment model. 4 19 The Cold War "amounted to a competition of ideologies, each of
which had secured international legitimacy."420 The relationships of nation-states,
therefore, are now more stable, and "[tihis new stability is consequential for for-
eign relations law doctrines established on different premises. Doctrines contin-
gent on a world of hostile, competitive interstate relations should be reexamined
with the emergence of global governance systems."'4 21
The second phenomena referenced by Spiro - "disaggregation" of the nation-
state-refers to the emerging ways in which nation-states view one another and
communicate. 422 Previously, communication among states involved formal, highly
ritualized contact in the form of diplomacy.4 23 States only recognized those au-
thorized to speak for the country in such formal contexts. 424 The underlying be-
411. Id. at 660.
412. Id. at 661.
413. Id. at 662.
414. See id.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 663-65.
417. Id. at 665.
418. Id. While I do not agree that terrorism can be dealt with under a criminal law paradigm,
it is important to recognize that terrorism represents a nontraditional war and thus places less
pressure on formal nation-state relationships. In fact, it engenders-or should engender-state
to state cooperation in the face of a common, decentralized enemy.
419. Id. at 666.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 667.
422. Id. at 667-71.
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lief was in "a reality of central government control and centralized relations among
states in the international arena."'425 Now, however, "[c]entralized diplomacy is in
decline." 426 Thus, governments understand that there are many actors and deci-
sion makers that comprise the government of any other nation, and states are com-
ing to understand that the "rule of international law is advanced by disaggregating
the state." 427 Although it remains important to speak with one voice, the interna-
tional system is no longer blind to entities other than nation-states. 42 8
This is a particularly important concept when considering the hybrid nature of
most transnational corporations. Indeed, because they are both public and private
entities-public actors engaged in ventures with foreign governments, and private
actors engaged in business for profit-the distinction between public and private
breaks down. These hybrid entities, in turn, are viewed less and less as represent-
ing the interests of the United States. Consequently, TNs may be held to the rule of
international law without disrupting the relationships among nation-states-pre-
cisely because those nation-states understand the diverse and complex relation-
ships among actors within a state, and how those relationships play out on the
international stage.
The third phenomenon Spiro articulates is economic globalization. As a re-
sult of the increased mobility of capital, "[s]tates now face a situation in which
increasing regulatory burdens (including labor standards, environmental controls,
and taxes) may prompt the departure of capital."'429 The states with more burden-
some regulations may discourage investment to the extent that an alternative, less
burdensome regulatory scheme is available elsewhere. 430 Furthermore, because
of the disaggregation phenomena discussed above, a corporation, for example, (or
any economic actor) has a heightened interest in communicating with "subnational"
actors (states, municipalities). "Insofar as regulatory policy is set at the subnational
level, economic actors can pit subnational jurisdictions against each other as regu-
latory competitors."'43 1 In short, subnational units, such as the state of Maine,
must situate themselves in the international context. Corporations must do so also.
In order to maintain global competitiveness, they have to reduce "locational costs,"
which leads to competition among states to attract this capital. The result is that
[a]t the same time as globalization has diminished state capacity to discipline
corporations ... it has added another mechanism, one that plays out across na-
tional boundaries. To the extent that corporations face the discipline of global
markets on questions of operational venues.., they can in turn exercise leverage
over governmental authorities, central and subnational. 432
423. Id. at 667.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 668.
426. Id. at 669.
427. Id. at 670-71.
428. Id. at 671.
429. Id. (footnotes omitted).




b. Justice Jackson's Youngstown Steel Concurrence Revisited: Where is the
Twilight Zone?
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown Steel laid out his three-
tiered analysis on the scope of executive power, which attempted to account for
both the separation of powers and the sharing of power between the legislative and
the executive branches. 4 33 Along those same ,lines, the boundaries and shared
responsibilities between the judiciary and the executive branches can and should
be articulated more carefully, and defined in terms compatible with globalization
and the diffusion of power.
Several logical rules of decision make sense when Spiro's new global realities
are considered. First, when a suit would directly impede national security efforts
by the executive during wartime (either under emergency presidential war powers
or with congressional authorization through a declaration of war), the judiciary
should indeed defer to the judgment of the executive branch. This principle is
well-established. 434 However, a second type of suit occurs in the "twilight zone"
of judicial/executive power,43 5 which would include ATCA cases filed in situa-
tions where the impact on foreign relations is confined to speculation that such a
suit might upset an ally in the ill-defined "war on terror," or would "threaten a
fragile peace" process in a civil war only brokered by the United States, such as
was the case in Sarei. When presented with this second category of suits, a court
should carefully and independently examine the assertions of the executive, even
when Statements of Interests clearly urge dismissal of the suit, to determine if the
effect asserted is substantial enough to reverse the constitutional presumption in
favor of judicial review and court enforcement of federal statutes. Courts should
consider factors such as whether war and peace are involved in the concerns of the
executive, whether the foreign policy articulated is expressly or implicitly sup-
ported by Congress, and whether the administration's foreign policy conflicts with
international law. If an executive policy does conflict with international law, courts
are duty-bound by the Constitution and by a congressional statute (the ATCA,
among others) to uphold international law. Courts, therefore, should not merely
accept and adopt executive pronouncements that some diffuse danger exists to
U.S. foreign relationships. Caution and close analysis, however, is still warranted
to determine the justiciability question. In short, courts must recognize that just
because a case involves a foreign country does not mean it is a matter of foreign
policy.
The third category of ATCA suits involves purely economic concerns, often
expressly articulated by the executive branch, and often deferred to by the courts.
433. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643-48 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Justice Jackson's concurrence laid out the framework for evaluating the scope of
executive power. He articulated three "zones" of operation: (1) when the President acts with
express or implied authorization from Congress; (2) when the President acts in the face of con-
gressional silence on an issue; (3) where the President acts contrary to the express or implied
will of Congress. Id.
434. See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2
(1866). But see Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2003) (holding that Congress-and not the
President acting alone-has the sole authority to designate U.S. citizens captured on U.S. soil as
enemy combatants, in spite of the broad authority granted to the President to protect national
security interests in times of war), rev'don other grounds, 124 S. Ct. 271 (2004).
435. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 637.
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In these suits, however, courts generally should not defer to the executive. Matters
of international economic policy do not concern courts; violations of international
law do. If a tort in violation of the law of nations occurs and is brought before a
U.S. federal court, the economic impact of ruling on that case should remain out-
side of the court's calculus. 436 Granted, there are times when economic develop-
ment initiatives are part of the government's overall foreign policy strategy; how-
ever, that this remains relevant to the aspirations of the U.S. government with
regard to its own commercial self-interest and the overall development strategy for
the target country, suggests that it should not influence the court in either direction.
There may, in fact, be circumstances in which the economic consequences to an
ATCA defendant could be so devastating to the host country that irreparable harm
may be done. This, however, is pure speculation and should be addressed when
the case of catastrophic divestment actually presents itself to the court, and it is
clear that an economic concern has become a matter of foreign policy inappropri-
ate for judicial resolution. Short of such a situation, the court should not base
questions of justiciability on economic impact-at home or abroad. It is certainly
arguable that most TNs can take financial hits in discrete pockets of their opera-
tions without suffering on the massive scale predicted by such organizations as the
Institute for International Economics (IIS). 437 Even the IIS admits that "no de-
cided [ATCA] cases can be cited to confirm that the nightmare scenario. . . will
come to pass."'4 38 If that time comes, nation-states, the World Trade Organization,
the U.N., and other international development agencies can craft a response. So,
too, can the United States Congress. To date, however, no domestic or interna-
tional law has been passed that would remove such suits from the court's cogni-
zance.
IV. USEFUL MODELS AND LESSONS TO GUIDE COURTS REVIEWING ATCA CASES
A. Belgium's Universal Jurisdiction Law
In 1993, Belgium passed a universal jurisdiction law, allowing Belgian courts
to try persons accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes even
if neither the accused nor the victims had any connection whatsoever to Belgium. 439
436. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955); Nebbia v.
People of New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-75
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has long held the opinion first articulated
by Justice Holmes in his dissent in Lochner. Justice Holmes repudiated a form of judicial activ-
ism that would read economic policy into the Constitution. Interestingly, the Court seems to be
engaging in a similar analysis in ATCA suits when it is persuaded by arguments that ruling on
corporate abuse cases would impede the ability of United States-based TNs to operate in foreign
countries and thereby diminish U.S. economic strength by creating risk-averse companies un-
willing to invest overseas. It is important to remember that whether these cases would have
such an economic impact is purely speculative, and, more importantly, is not, pursuant to decla-
rations of our own Supreme Court, a matter appropriate for judicial concern. International eco-
nomic theory should not necessarily drive the Court's interpretation of international law in this
context. Thus, without a clear statement of intent from Congress to consider the economic
impact of human rights-based litigation, the court should not be considering economic impacts.
437. See AwAiENiNG MONSTER, supra note 6, at 1-2, for predictions of divestment.
438. Id. at 2.
439. Malvina Halberstam, Belgium's Universal Jurisdiction Law: Vindication of Interna-
tional Justice or Pursuit of Politics? 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 247, 247 (2003).
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Although this was not the first universal jurisdiction law any nation had passed, it
was the broadest. 440 In 2001, the Belgian Court of Cassation tried and convicted
two Rwandan nuns and two Rwandan men for their role in atrocities committed
during the 1993-94 Rwandan civil war.44 1 Also in 2001, Palestinian survivors of
the 1982 massacre of refugees by Lebanese militiamen at the Sabra and Shatila
camps invoked Belgium's universal jurisdiction law against current Israeli Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon, who was then Israel's defense minister.44 2 In March 2003,
seven Iraqi families invoked Belgium's law against U.S. President George H. W.
Bush, current Vice President Dick Cheney (then Secretary of Defense), Secretary
of State Colin Powell (then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and retired
General Norman Sachwarzkopf for alleged war crimes committed during the first
Gulf War.443 As previously stated, the court successfully prosecuted and jailed the
Rwandans of war crimes. Furthermore, it allowed the complaint against Sharon to
proceed but granted him immunity while in office.444 In response to U.S. protests
regarding the Gulf War complaint-including Secretary of State Powell's warning
that Belgium was risking its status as "diplomatic capital and the host state for
[NATO] by allowing investigations of those who might visit Belgium"- the Bel-
gian parliament proposed, and soon passed, amendments to limit the scope of the
law.445 Soon after, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld threatened to withhold
funding from Belgium for the new NATO headquarters unless Belgium rescinded
its law.446
To date, Belgium has changed its law in three ways: (1) universal jurisdiction
was replaced by jurisdiction requiring a link with Belgium, either through the na-
tionality of the victim or the accused; (2) immunity from prosecution was recog-
nized for foreign heads of state; and (3) the public prosecutor was given a larger
role when jurisdiction based on the passive personality principle was asserted (Bel-
gium allows criminal indictments via plaintiff-prosecutors but amended the uni-
versal jurisdiction law to limit this power in the case of this law).447 Critics hold
this up as proof that the use of universal jurisdictions to vindicate human rights is
inherently political and cannot be applied evenhandedly.44 8 Belgium's response
to Israel's protests against the Sharon indictment, for example, differed dramati-
cally from its response to U.S. protests against the Gulf War indictment, suggest-
ing to some that European bias against Israel animated the difference. 449
The most obvious contrast between Belgium's law and the ATCA is that
Belgium's law was used in an unprecedented manner to indict heads of state rather
than corporations. Such indictments clearly interfere in international relations,
440. Steven R. Ratner, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 888,
889 (2003) [hereinafter Ratner, Belgium].
441. Id. .
442. Id. at 889-90; compare with Halberstam, supra note 439, at 265-66 (arguing the differ-
ing responses to the indictments of Israeli officials versus U.S. officials demonstrates the self-
serving, inherently political purposes such statutes serve and, consequently, their inability to
deliver justice).
443. Ratner, Belgium, supra note 440, at 890.
444. Halberstam, supra note 439, at 248.
445. Ratner, Belgium, supra note 440, at 890.
446. Id. at 891.
447. d.
448. See Halberstam, supra note 439, at 265-65.
449. See generally id.
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and courts should dismiss any such case as a political question (and clearly would,
given current sovereign immunity doctrine). Belgium's experience does offer in-
sights into the limiting principles that have and will continue to sustain the ATCA
as an even-handed-albeit limited-tool. Belgium's experience with its universal
jurisdiction law suggests how courts may meet the "twin goals of individual ac-
countability and public order."450 Commentator Steven Ratner notes that indict-
ments against heads of state will always create resentments and tension, and while
in "some cases individual accountability is worth the price of those tensions, '4 5 1
in cases involving corporate defendants such tensions rarely arise.
Ratner outlines the convergence of eight factors that supported successful pros-
ecution of the Rwandans under Belgium's law:
(1) the presence of the accused in Belgium...; (2) the severity of the atrocities.
.; (3) the strength of the evidence against them; (4) the sense that the prosecu-
tion was apolitical ... ; (5) the absence of an effective judiciary in the country
where the atrocities took place ... ; (6) the special links between the state of the
crime and Belgium; (7) the political powerlessness of the defendants; and (8) the
lack of opposition from any state, in particular Rwanda, to their prosecution. 452
Ratner then gives relative weight to each factor to determine how far beyond
the Rwandan convergence a court should go when asserting jurisdiction to enforce
human rights norms. 453 He concludes that links between the forum state and the
state where the crime occurred, and the political powerlessness of the defendants
should carry little weight, while the presence of the accused, the severity of the
atrocities, the strength of the case, and the absence of an effective judiciary in the
state where the atrocities occurred are critical to assertions of jurisdiction.454 Ratner
further argues that the degree to which a given prosecution may inflame political
tensions and the foreign policy repercussions flowing from a state's objection to
prosecution require a balancing test.455 The political power/powerlessness of the
defendants and the links between the forum state and the state where the atrocities
occurred need not be accorded deference by a court. 456
Notably, these factors are to a great extent already part of the analysis of U.S.
courts when faced with ATCA cases. Personal jurisdiction rules require the pres-
ence of the defendant before the case can proceed (in the case of corporate defen-
dants, this usually means the parent company has enough minimum contacts for a
court to assert jurisdiction), the forum non conveniens analysis helps ensure that
cases are dismissed if the suit can and should be heard elsewhere, and the applica-
tion of the prudential political doctrines (political question, act of state, interna-
tional comity) obliges the court to balance the competing interests of individual
justice and political policies in the context of foreign relations. Furthermore, the
test courts have devised at the threshold stage in ATCA cases-the violation must
be clear, specific and obligatory on all nations 457 -protects against the vagaries of
international law. This allows for the punishment of individuals in instances where
450. Ratner, Belgium, supra note 440, at 893.
451. Id. at 894.
452. Id. at 892.
453. Id. at 894-95.
454. Id. at 894-96.
455. Id. at 894-95.
456. Id. at 895.
457. See supra, Part II(D) (discussion of the rules of decision in modem ATCA cases).
"individual accountability is worth the price of... tensions."458 American courts
already avoid the pitfalls of Belgium's universal jurisdiction law, and with refine-
ment of the political question doctrine and corporate liability theories, courts will
be better-equipped to discern cases that should be heard from those that should
not. Specifically, when courts adjust to the changes brought by globalization and
accord proper weight to opinions of the executive branch, such dangers are re-
duced, minimizing the possibility of irresponsible assertions of universal jurisdic-
tion of the kind seen in Belgium. Indeed, individual accountability is an important
supplement to state-to-state political and diplomatic pressure (in the form of trea-
ties, accords, and sanctions for diplomatic violation),4 59 and the ATCA provides
that counterbalance.4 60
B. Piracy Law and the Concept of the Stateless Vessel
Courts confronting TN defendants in ATCA cases are struggling with the very
nature of the entity with which they are dealing. In addition to their visceral appli-
cation of the political question doctrine, they inappropriately apply domestic cor-
porate law concepts predicated on the unique legal and economic environment of
the United States. As discussed above, this paradigm rests on the assumed power
structure Shapiro and others challenge but which courts have yet to recognize.
Courts must adjust their thinking to the new realities of globalization. At the same
time, however, they should summon all legal traditions available to assist in pro-
viding this new analytical framework. One such tradition can be found in the law
of piracy. Specifically, TNs that violate human rights norms are analogous to state-
less ships. As the stateless vessel undermines world order because it is literally
accountable to no one for its crimes, so too does the TN that maintains complex
business relationships across multiple borders wielding power greater than many
458. Ratner, Belgium, supra note 440, at 894.
459. See generally Stephens, Individuals, supra note 15.
460. In their lament against the ATCA, Hufbauer and Mitrokostas applaud the advancements
during the Nuremburg Trials after the Second World War, but insist that this was about indi-
vidual criminal liability. AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 6, at 45. This distinction is important,
they assert, because an "individual[]" is not the same as a corporation. Id. at 45-46. Underlying
this assumption is the idea that somehow, corporations are less culpable than the individuals that
make the decisions for them. Furthermore, this ignores those areas of the law in which corpora-
tions prefer to be treated as individuals-notably relative to First Amendment law. See, e.g.,
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted in
cases in which corporations asserted their First Amendment right to combat accusations of un-
fair labor practices as being outside the commercial speech context and therefore protected,
even if the information Nike presented in public documents was misleading). Corporations
cannot have it both ways.
Hufbauer and Mitrokostas also object to the fact that, "[u]nlike the Nuremburg court and its
successors, the [ATCA] does not imprison defendants but rather awards damages. Along the
way, the [ATCA] rewards class action plaintiffs and their attorneys. [ATCA] cases create enor-
mous problems that, when added together, amount to unilateral justice bordering on imperial-
ism." AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 6, at 46. Again, when legal policies significantly impact
the profits-or are even perceived to have a potential to impact profits significantly-corporate
advocates are enraged. However, when plaintiff's counsel stands to make some money from a
class action lawsuit, this raises eyebrows and leads to skeptical questioning of human rights
lawyers. The problem, it seems, is not "unilateral justice bordering on imperialism"; the prob-
lem, rather, is the perceived impact such "individual" accountability might have on corporate
profits.
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of the countries in which it operates. As Professor Deva observes, "[s]ince the
area of [TN's] activities defies any notion of boundaries, and since they expect
uniform rules governing international trade, it is a necessary corollary that their
'home' is no longer limited to the country of incorporation. Rather, it extends to
the whole world... -461
Piracy law can provide some useful analogies to foster proper analysis of who
is committing these crimes and torts in violation of international law, and the link
between the actor and the nature of the crime itself. It also provides some reveal-
ing contrasts.
1. The Offense of Piracy
Piracy under international law is defined as "crime jure gentium, 'an offense
against the law of nations. "462 There has been much dispute over what acts con-
stitute piracy, but under both the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (to which the United States is
not a party), piracy includes "[a]ny illegal acts of violence, detention[,] or any act
of depredation, committed for private ends . .. [oln the high seas ... or ... in a
place outside the jurisdiction of any State.",463 An act of piracy must be commit-
ted for a private end. 464 Piracy also encompasses "voluntary and knowing partici-
pation or incitement to commit those acts." 4 65 The fact that the crime of piracy, by
definition, is committed for "private ends" makes it a particularly compelling anal-
ogy to crimes committed by TNs, presumably also committed for private gain.466
Prior to the International Conventions on the Law of the Sea,467 courts grap-
pling with charges of piracy raised concerns very similar to those raised in ATCA
cases: what is international law? where do we look to find out what it is? how do
we resolve differences? Although each nation has its own definition of piracy, the
definition under international law is both separate and derived from the laws of
each individual state. 468 The U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Smith de-
fined piracy.4 69 In Smith, the Court attempted to locate and articulate customary
international law in much the same manner as it does in the current ATCA cases.
The case involved a man who, along with others, engaged in mutiny on an Argen-
461. Deva, supra note 291, at 40.
462. Randall, supra note 61, at 796 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153,
161 (1820)).
463. Id. at 797 n.67 (quoting Article 15 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas);
Alfred P. Rubin, Is Piracy Illegal?, 70 Am. J. INT'L L. 92, 92 (1976) (quoting Article 15 of the
1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas).
464. Randall, supra note 61, at 797.
465. Rubin, supra note 463, at 92.
466. The obvious difference between piracy and violations by TNs, of course, is that most
corporate abuses occur on land within the territorial boundaries of a sovereign state, further
complicating the jurisdictional questions. See infra, Part IV.C textual discussion of this differ-
ence and how it might be managed.
467. See generally Harvard Research Draft, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 743 (Supp. 1932); Geneva
Convention on the High Seas (1958); the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference (1975);
Montego Bay Convention (1982); United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982).
468. George R. Constantinople, Towards a New Definition of Piracy: The Achille Lauro
Incident, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 723, 727 (1986).
469. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
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tine ship.470 He, along with some accomplices, seized the ship and subsequently,
without any authority, attacked and plundered a Spanish vessel on the high seas.
4 7 1
The instigator was captured by the United States and brought before a federal
court.4 72 The Supreme Court eventually heard the case and interpreted the piracy
statute, which read: "'if any person or persons whatsoever, shall, upon the high
seas, commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, and such of-
fender or offenders shall be brought into, or found in, the United States, every such
offender or offenders shall, upon conviction thereof... be punished with death." 473
Defense counsel argued that to define piracy simply by reference to the "law of
nations" was too uncertain and imprecise.4 74 The Court, however, unhesitatingly
found the law of nations to provide ample guidance to provide for a constitutional
prosecution. 475 Justice Story, writing for the majority, stated that all "writers con-
cur... that robbery, or forcible depredations upon the sea... is piracy.*- 476
Note that the Court in Smith "ascertained the definition of piracy under cus-
tomary international law to define the crime of piracy under U.S. law."'477 The
Court first looked at the Constitutional provision authorizing Congress to "define
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas, and Offences against
the Law of Nations." 478 It then examined the domestic statute under which Smith
was being prosecuted. 479 Because the Court found that both the Constitution and
the statute defined piracy by incorporation of international law norms, the Court
defined the law of the case by reference to the law of nations: "What the law of
nations on this subject is, may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists,
writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations;
or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law."480 After examining
many of these sources, the Court insisted it had "no hesitation in declaring, that
piracy, by the law of nations, is robbery upon the sea, and that it is sufficiently and
constitutionally defined by the fifth section of the act of 1819."481 The Court felt
no reluctance to define and punish offenses defined by the law of nations in this
context.
In his dissent, however, Justice Livingston articulated one of the very same
concerns that pervades today's debate over ATCA claims: that Congress should
precisely define what it perceives to be the offense under the law of nations, rather
than leaving it to the courts to ascertain international law with only the guidance of
academics, commentators, and world opinion.4 82 As Justice Livingston lamented:
470. Id. at 154.
471. Id.
472. Id. at 153-54.
473. Id. at 154 n.a.
474. Id. at 157.
475. Id. at 158-59.
476. Id. at 161.
477. Constantinople, supra note 468, at 729.
478. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
479. See Constantinople, supra note 468, at n.16. The U.S. Constitution provides that Con-
gross has the authority to prosecute the crime of piracy, and present federal law on piracy is set
forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1651-61 (1982). Id. It provides in pertinent part: "whoever, on the high
seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought
into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life." Id.
480. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 160-61.
481. Id. at 162.
482. Id. at 182.
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Nor does it make any difference in this case, that the law of nations forms part of
the law of every civilized country. This may be the case to a certain extent; but as
to criminal cases, and as to the offence of piracy in particular, the law of nations
could not be supposed of itself to form a rule of action... Congress [has] power
to punish offences against the law of nations, and yet it would hardly be deemed
a fair and legitimate execution of this authority, to declare, that all offences against
the law of nations, without defining any one of them, should be punished with
death. 483
A similar protest against the inchoate nature of the law of nations appears again in
the contemporary context in Judge Bork's concurrence in Tel-Oren, in which he
stressed that it is not the proper role of the courts to "infer a cause of action not
explicitly given" by Congress.484 He argued that none of the potential sources -
federal common law, the law of nations, or acts of Congress-have provided a
cause of action for "terrorist" activities, and urged his colleagues to view the ATCA
as merely a grant of jurisdiction and nothing more.4 85
2. Jurisdiction over the Offense of Piracy
General international law provides that each state has jurisdiction over "non-
piratical acts" on the high seas committed by persons legitimately sailing under
that country's flag. 486 If the act is one of piracy, however, no connection is re-
quired with the country arresting the pirate.487 According to Article 105 of the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, "parties [to the convention] have the
right, but not the obligation, to assume jurisdiction over piratical acts with which
they have no connection. Nonparties to the convention may assert universal juris-
diction over piracy under customary international law."'4 88 This is an exception to
all recognized principles of jurisdiction on the high seas. Indeed, "the authority of
every state to capture pirates and their vessels is an exception to the general rule
limiting each state's jurisdiction on the high seas to its own vessels and nation-
als." 489 One rationale for this exception, as articulated in the Harvard Research
Draft, is that "by engaging in piracy, individuals and their vessels become dena-
tionalized," and the protection of the flag under which the ship is sailing is for-
feited.490
Perhaps a more convincing rationale for universal jurisdiction over pirates
rests on the "nature of piratical offenses" themselves. 49 1 The pirate is considered
the enemy of all people, and "[p]iracy may comprise particularly heinous and wicked
483. Id. at 182-83.
484. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concur-
ring).
485. Id. at 810-19. See infra Part II.C.2, for textual discussion of the diverse viewpoints
expressed by the three concurring judges in this case. The Supreme Court lodged a muted
rejection of Justice Bork's view in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. See supra text accompanying note
13.
486. Randall, supra note 61, at 791.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 791-92 (citing U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 105, U.N. Doc. A/
CON E G2/122, U.N. SALEs No. E.83.v.5 (1983)).




acts of violence or depredation, which are often committed indiscriminately against
the vessels and nationals of numerous states."'492 Acts of piracy are particularly
offensive because they occur in places where the pirate can easily take advantage
of a lack of law and order due to the lack of any valid organizational structure. 49 3
When compared with modem international law offenses, one can see that "war
crimes and crimes against humanity are analogous to piracy in that they are typi-
cally committed in locations where they will not be prevented or punished eas-
ily. ' 494 Furthermore, "[p]iratical attacks, particularly when viewed cumulatively,
may disrupt commerce and navigation on the high seas. Such lawlessness was
especially harmful to the world at a time when intercourse among states occurred
primarily by way of the high seas, thus making piracy the concern of all states."4 95
3. The Stateless Vessel
A vessel sailing under the flag of no nation or the flags of more than one
nation is considered stateless under international law496 and presents a particu-
larly difficult problem. All states, therefore, have jurisdiction over offenses com-
mitted aboard stateless vessels-whether piratical offenses or not.497 The state-
less vessel, like the pirate, is viewed as particularly dangerous, since its crew could
conceivably commit crimes for private gain with impunity, leading to chaos and
undermining the capacity of all states to protect their citizens and their property.
Interestingly, the protection of private property plays an important role in the ap-
parent empathy in court pronouncements against stateless vessels.
In United States v. Marino-Garcia49 8 the Eleventh Circuit examined univer-
sal jurisdiction over stateless vessels as it applied in a drug trafficking case. 499
The issue raised was whether the U.S. court may assert jurisdiction over stateless
vessels carrying illegal drugs in the absence of an actual intent to distribute those
drugs in the United States.500 The court concluded that 21 U.S.C.A. § 955(a)
extended "the criminal jurisdiction of the United States to all stateless vessels on
the high seas engaged in the distribution of controlled substances." 501 The court
reached this conclusion by dispensing with the "nexus requirement" and held that
operators of stateless vessels may be stopped, searched, and prosecuted in the United
States if they are engaged in drug trafficking, even in the absence of proof that they
intended to distribute the drugs inside the United States. 50 2 In other words, the
492. Id. at 794.
493. Id. at 803-04.
494. Id.
495. Id. at 794-95. The modem crime of hijacking supports this idea. Because international
commerce rests in large part on the reliability, safety and availability of air travel, the world
community has entered into agreements condemning hijacking as a violation of the law of na-
tions akin to acts of piracy and punishable by any nation under the theory of universal jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 818-19.
-496. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1379 n.10 (11th Cir. 1982).
497. Id. at 1382-83.
498. Id. at 1373.
499. Id. at 1377.
500. Id. at 1377, 1377 n.1.
501. Id. at 1377.
502. Id. at 1383.
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requirement that there be some connection to national security and the assertion of
jurisdiction over the particular vessel (the nexus requirement) previously used to
justify jurisdiction in drug trafficking cases was rendered superfluous in cases where
the vessel is found to be "stateless." A stateless vessel is "[a] ship 'which sail[s]
under the flag[s] of two or more States, using them according to convenience.,' 503
In short, a ship trying to buck the system by registering in two or more states may
not be considered belonging to any one of those states and thus is subject to uni-
versal jurisdiction.
In its analysis, the court began by considering the definitions provided in the
drug trafficking statute itself.50 4 The statute made it unlawful for "any person on
board a vessel of the United States, or on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States on the high seas, to knowingly or intentionally manufacture or
distribute, or to possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled sub-
stance."'50 5 The issue was what Congress meant by "a vessel subject to the juris-
diction of the United States. ' 506 The legislative history indicated that Congress
intended to extend jurisdiction to the "'maximum... permitted under international
law."' 507 Thus, the Court looked to international law principles of jurisdiction for
its answer.50 8 After surveying domestic and international case law as well as the
work of commentators and experts, the court concluded that under international
law "all nations have the right to assert jurisdiction over stateless vessels on the
high seas." 5 09
C. Dissimilarity: Piracy and Stateless Vessel Rules Preserve the Economic Order-
ATCA Litigation Challenges It
Underlying enforcement of the ATCA are human and environmental rights
concerns rather than economic rights. ATCA cases rest on ideal moral behavior as
opposed to economic self-interest. Although in the abstract, respect for human
rights would ultimately stabilize the world economic order, in the short term, TNs
could be negatively impacted by large money judgments, resulting in profit loss,
risk aversion, and perhaps divestment in developing countries. Divestment is, of
course, speculative, fueled by lobbyists such as the Institute for International Eco-
nomics, but such a possibility exists and colors court opinions. A court's assump-
tion that these economic and thus diplomatic consequences might ensue demon-
strates their inability to see beyond the current power paradigm. While piracy law
and assertions of broad jurisdiction in this context advance the goal of interna-
tional commerce, ATCA cases are seen as a threat to the economic prosperity of
503. Id. at 1382 (quoting 21 U.S.C.A. § 955a).
504. Id. at 1379.
505. Id. at 1379 n.9 (quoting 21 U.S.C.A. § 955a).
506. Id. at 1379.
507. Id. (internal citation omitted).
508. Id. at 1380.
509. Id. at 1383.
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the United States, the country where the violations occurred, and indirectly, the
world.5 10
An offending corporation, however, resembles a corporate pirate on a state-
less vessel.5 11 Furthermore, the use of the corporate form to avoid state affiliation
and thereby escape accountability resembles the stateless vessel. The international
(and U.S.) response to suits involving stateless vessels or pirates is clear. Univer-
sal jurisdiction applies and no nexus with the prosecuting state is required. ATCA
claims, however, tend to be much more highly scrutinized for the requisite nexus
and dismissed when foreign relations concerns might be implicated. How can we
account for the differing treatment?
As Professor Deva points out, "the area of [TNs'] activities defies any notion
of boundaries"-much like TNs.5 12 The most egregious form of corporate abuses,
therefore, resemble in some compelling ways the problem of piracy and the prob-
lem of stateless vessels in admiralty law. Although the legal issues are more com-
plex, reference to these principles can provide assistance, and perhaps more im-
portantly, confidence, that legal precedent in other areas of international law sup-
ports the justiciability of ATCA cases.
There are important differences between piracy and international corporate
abuses, to be sure. Where the stateless vessel is concerned, territorial sovereignty
issues never arise because the vessel belongs to no nation, and the harm has not
been committed within the boundaries of any given territory. In instances of pi-
racy, vicarious liability is rarely at issue, at least not in the forms presented in
complex corporate litigation; complicated issues of state action or theories of indi-
rect liability of parent corporations are not implicated. However, state action is
never at issue in piracy cases because, by definition, a pirate never acts on behalf
of a state, though a state may endorse his conduct. Thus, the prosecuting court can
ignore any declared state affiliation.
Once courts acknowledge that their reluctance flows in part from outdated
conceptions of where the power lies (with nation-states) and recognize anew that
individuals seeking private gain can disrupt the world order (as pirates do) and
violate individual rights on a scale never-before imagined, they may be able to
accept both the urgency of stemming corporate abuses abroad and the traditional
5 10. The idea of holding TNs accountable for human rights abuses turns this unstated as-
sumption of international law on its head, which may explain to some degree the incomplete
explanations courts provide for their reluctance to apply international law in ATCA cases. Cor-
porate accountability could, in fact, harm the U.S. economy (and ultimately, the world economy)
by driving up prices for domestic products. Such a disruption of the economic world order
makes courts, companies, and nations very uncomfortable. The question is-does such concern
for the world economy, completely legitimate in and of itself. encompass a value superior to the
environmental and human rights of the individual plaintiffs who bring these actions? While
recognizing that economic prosperity and human rights bear a complex relationship to one an-
other, does the former justify lack of enforcement of the latter? Do the utilitarian ends of pre-
serving the perceived economic prosperity that proponents of globalization predict provide suf-
ficient justification? More importantly, whose economic prosperity does this policy sustain?
511. It is interesting to note that piracy has taken on a more contemporary meaning in the
context of software piracy, but again, the pirate in this context is undermining the economic
order by supplanting the corporation's right to earn profits from its own creations. Again, to
apply the concept of piracy to entities that are not threatening commerce, and to ask courts to
allow litigation to proceed that may harm economic interests, presents a greater challenge- one
that forces confrontation with the dominant paradigm.
512. Deva, supra note 291, at 40.
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legal principle that supports holding corporations accountable. Courts must em-
brace and understand both the newness of this dilemma and its familiarity.
The United States, as the world's largest economic power, has a legal and
moral obligation to provide a forum for justice. Not only are U.S. courts fully
functioning, open and publicly accountable, the press is free, and principles of
personal jurisdiction ensure that corporate defendants possess the requisite mini-
mum contacts with the U.S. Further, those bringing ATCA claims often do so
because similar remedies are not available to them in their home country, either
because they live under an oppressive regime, or they live under a farcical democ-
racy.
The new paradigm of international relationships and the distribution of global
power, combined with the continued influence of the United States on the world
stage sets up a unique obligation and opportunity for courts to shift their thinking
with regard to the various doctrines of judicial restraint, and to re-characterize the
nature of TNs for purposes of human rights litigation. Justiciability concerns can
be quelled by reference to piracy law and the stateless vessel concept. The effec-
tiveness of the current ATCA framework is reinforced by reference to Belgium's
experience and the resulting lessons learned- lessons that have already been con-
sidered and applied by U.S. courts. The additional complexities presented by prin-
ciples of limited liability and the connection between economic concerns, diplo-
matic concerns, and the ideals of human dignity can be addressed by shifting the
way courts conceive of modern power relationships- and, in particular, the politi-
cal question doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION: A REFORMULATED POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE,
BURDEN-SHIFrING AND WELL-GROUNDED PRINCIPLES FOR
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
As Justice Cardozo remarked, "'obscurity of statute or of precedent or of cus-
toms or of morals, or collision between some or all of them, may leave the law
unsettled, and cast a duty upon the courts to declare it retrospectively in the exer-
cise of a power frankly legislative in function. '513 Similarly, Justice Frankfurter
commented, "[t]he intrinsic difficulties of language and the emergence after enact-
ment of situations not anticipated by the most gifted legislative imagination, re-
veal doubts and ambiguities in statutes that compel judicial construction." 5 14 The
ATCA is an ambiguous statute that compels judicial construction. In ATCA cases,
courts announce their conception of the role of U.S. courts in the international
enforcement scheme, what constitutes "foreign relations" for political question
purposes, and who is responsible within our own government for enforcement of
private international law. Implicit in these decisions are assumptions about the
degree to which legal constructs should interrupt rather than facilitate international
commerce and advance U.S. self-interest. To refrain from ruling in an ATCA case
makes as clear a policy statement as does a decision on the merits. Thus, it is
513. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring) (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 128 (1920) (em-
phasis added) (responding to Judge Robb's insistence that the case should be dismissed because
it presented a nonjusticiable political question)).
514. Id. (Edwards, J., concurring) (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Read-
ing of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 529 (1947)).
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imperative that courts clearly define the basis and policy behind dismissals and
decisions-what international law principles apply and which political philosophy
informs that choice. This Comment has argued that the analysis in many recent
ATCA court cases is flawed, and asks that courts recognize that a paradigmatic
shift has occurred as a result of globalization. This realization should alter judicial
restraint doctrines and push courts toward more frequent validation of judicial
review, even when foreign relations concerns arise in the commercial context. Under
this suggested framework, Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC would not have been dismissed,
and the Doe v. Unocal case would have proceeded on the merits.
Professor Saman Zia-Zarifi argues that as "home of the largest number of
[TNs] in the world, [U.S. courts] can and should engage in this sort of transnational
public litigation. '5 15 Indeed, if the U.S. is willing to enforce.rules against bribery
abroad, prohibitions against drug trafficking on the high seas (even when there is
no link to the U.S. and the drugs are not destined for the U.S.), then it "certainly
can and should prosecute [TNs] for acts of murder, torture or slave trading." 5 16
The ATCA promotes international enforcement of basic human rights law. As one
commentator notes,
The size and power of [TNs], and their imperative to seek profits wherever they
can be found, often in developing countries ruled by oppressive governments,
puts them in contact with acts of brutality around the globe; the private nature of
corporations, and their reliance on the domestic laws of several different coun-
tries for their very existence, makes them awkward subjects for international law.
The revolutionary conceptual leap of ATCA litigation against corporations is to
collapse the distance between these two aspects of [TNs]. 5 17
The ATCA can and should be used to help fill this gap. Many current declarations
of rights and principles of environmental and human rights in the international
context exist but lack enforcement provisions. 5 18 Diplomacy is not keeping up
with globalization. And even while most countries agree on fundamental human
rights principles, it has proven difficult (but possible in some cases) to enforce
those rights. We are playing catch-up with globalization, and a resulting enforce-
ment vacuum exists in the area of human and environmental rights. This is why
the ATCA can and should be used as a transitional tool. It is not a perfect tool, but
it is a constitutional assertion of jurisdiction, valid under both domestic and inter-
national law, grounded in English and American common and admiralty law, and
constrained by various judicial restraint doctrines, that presently deter companies
from committing the most severe offenses, and provides for punishment and a
remedy where deterrence is inadequate. With refinement of the court-created doc-
trines of restraint, the imposition of a higher burden on TNs to know the activities
of their foreign direct investment projects and of their subsidiaries, and an under-
standing of the new global context in which commerce occurs, courts can and
should accept the invitation extended by the ATCA to apply international law and
stem the tide of corporate abuses.
Lorelle Londis
515. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 25, at 145.
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. See generally Deva, supra note 291.
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